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NOTE
JUST SCRATCHING THE SURFACE:
HOW EPA DENIED RENEWABLE ENERGY
DEVELOPERS THE LIABILITY PROTECTION
THEY NEED TO REPOWER AMERICA'S
CONTAMINATED LAND
I.

INTRODUCTION

Global' and domestic 2 efforts to curtail the emission of greenhouse
gases ("GHGs") 3 have created a strong impetus to accelerate renewable
energy deployment throughout the United States. The scientific
community in near unanimity identifies GHGs as the culprit of global
climate change. 4 Anthropogenic contributions of GHGs into the Earth's
1. See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 2, May 9, 1992, 1771
U.N.T.S. 107. International efforts began in earnest with the United Nation Framework Convention
on Climate Change ("UNFCCC"), which at the urging of scientists and climatologists worldwide,
seeks to limit the greenhouse gas emissions of member nations to avoid "dangerous anthropogenic
interference" with the climate where future reductions will not reduce the effects of climate change.
See id.; see also Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
arts. 3, 10, Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol] (setting caps on Annex I
developed nations while allowing for "common but differentiated responsibilities" to alleviate the
need for caps of developing nations' emissions that did not contribute to the majority of historical
anthropogenic carbon emissions).
2. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). Domestic litigation recently culminated in a
landmark Supreme Court decision requiring the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") to
examine whether carbon emissions endanger the public health or welfare, thereby requiring
regulation under the Clean Air Act (the "CAA"). See id. at 528-29, 532-33 (2007) (finding that
greenhouse gases can be an "air pollutant" under the CAA, and requiring the EPA to determine if
greenhouse gases cause, or contribute, to air pollution, which reasonably may be anticipated to
endanger the public health or welfare).
3. Glossary of Climate Change Terms, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/
glossary.html (last updated June 14, 2012) (identifying greenhouse gases as those that contribute to
the greenhouse effect by trapping a portion of the sun's infrared rays in the atmosphere to create a
homeostatic global climate in what is referred to as the "greenhouse effect"). Anthropogenic GHGs
predominantly consist of Carbon Dioxide (C0 2 ), Methane (CH4), Nitrous Oxide (N20), and
fluorinated gases such as perfluorocarbons, hydrofluorocarbons, and Sulfur Hexafluoride (SF 6 ).
Greenhouse Gas Emissions, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/ghgemissions/gases.html
(last updated Aug. 31,2012).
4. See generally, e.g., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE
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atmosphere, from the Industrial Revolution to the present, increased the
global concentration of these gases significantly.5 The impacts of climate
change vary geographically but in the aggregate will severely affect most
American populations and ecological services.6 The largest emitters of
GHGs, by industrial sector, are fossil-fuel combusting electricity
producers, with coal plants emitting an especially high amount of carbon
8
and carbon equivalent 7 relative to alternative forms of generation.
Recent domestic litigation has targeted both the energy producers and
the governmental agencies charged with regulating emissions into the
ambient air from such power plants in order to force carbon emission
reductions. 9 Lawsuits seeking to enforce procedural rights granted by
environmental statutes such as the Clean Air Act (the "CAA") have
fared better than those seeking damages or abatement based on common
law public nuisance. 10
CHANGE 2007: SYNTHESIS REPORT (2007) (identifying anthropogenic GHG concentrations as the
primary source of emerging climate change patterns).
5. See, e.g., EPA, EPA 430-R-10-007, CLIMATE CHANGE INDICATORS IN THE UNITED
STATES
14-16
(2010),
available
at
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/science/
recentac.html (calculating that atmospheric CO 2 concentrations are approximately 36% higher than
before 1750, methane 148%, and nitrous oxide 18%).
6. See, e.g., Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under
Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496, 66,497-98 (Dec. 15, 2009) (to be codified
at 40 C.F.R. pt. 1) (finding global climate change will cause or contribute to, inter alia, increased
exposure to airborne pathogens and allergens, increased severity in weather events such as
hurricanes, higher and more prolonged periods of drought, sea level rise, coastal erosion, famine,
desertification, invasive species migration, and longer and more severe periods of summer heat).
7. Glossary of Climate Change Terms, supra note 3 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Carbon equivalency is a concept that allows for conversion of various GHGs into a measure of
"million metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalents" by multiplying the volume of a particular gas by
such particular gas's global warming potential. Id. The global warming potential of a gas is the
cumulative radiative forcing effects of a gas over a specified time horizon (typically 100 years)
resulting from the emission of a mass unit of gas relative to a reference gas (such as C0 2). Id.
8.

Compare INT'L ENERGY AGENCY, CO2 EMISSIONS FROM FUEL COMBUSTION HIGHLIGHTS

122 figs.1, 5, 123 tbls.2-3 (2011), available at http://www.iea.org/co2highlights/co2highlights.pdf
(collecting global carbon emissions data by energy and industrial sector), with Air Emissions, EPA,
http://www.epa.gov/cleanenergy/energy-and-you/affect/air-emissions.html (last updated Dec. 28,
2007) (identifying renewable sources, including biomass, as producing only negligible amounts of
GHG emissions when compared to fossil-fuel-based electricity generation).
9. See Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, No. 10-174, slip. op. at 1,4 (U.S. June 20, 2011)
(seeking abatement of carbon emissions by five of the nation's largest power producers and carbon
emitters); Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 505 (2007) (seeking regulation of carbon emissions
by EPA under the CAA); Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863, 86869 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (seeking nearly four hundred million dollars in damages for forced relocation of
an Eskimo village due to a sea level rise caused by climate change).
10. See, e.g., Am. Elec. Power Co., at 1,4, 10 (holding that plaintiffs' claim for abatement of
public nuisance under federal common law is displaced by the CAA and denying relief);
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 528-29, 532-35 (holding that EPA must evaluate whether carbon
emissions cause or contribute to climate change and whether such emissions endanger the public
health or welfare); Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 868-69, 883 (holding that plaintiffs lacked standing
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The ubiquity of electricity, and its correlation to economic growth,
implicates electricity generation as an integral factor in any solution for
the control of GHG emissions. Electricity demand is intimately tied to
economic growth, with demand roughly tracking the performance of the
domestic economy." Renewables have the promise to meet the
increasing energy needs that economic growth requires without
12
climate change.
accelerating the amount of GHG emissions causing
Despite increasing international political recognition of the imminent
effects of climate change, the United States has not, unlike most
developed nations, 3 agreed to binding GHG emission limits or
reductions.' 4 Domestic legislation enacted to address climate change has
thus far focused on research, funding, and program development, rather
5
than comprehensive, economy-wide limits or reductions of GHGs.'
Concurrent with developing efforts to mitigate climate change in
the United States and abroad is the domestic need to remediate
contaminated lands, which are estimated to number over half a million
discrete sites nationwide. 16 These sites are the land-based results of
American economic growth and industrial activity, which largely
7
contributed to historic GHG emissions causing climate change.' Site
and public nuisance claim seeking damages for village relocation was barred by the political
question doctrine).
11. See Energy Intensity Indicators. Economy-Wide Total Energy Consumption, U.S. DEP'T
OF ENERGY, http://wwwl.eere.energy.gov/analysis/eii-total-energy.html (last updated Sept. 17,
2012) (noting that although energy intensity has decreased with an increase in energy use, the rate of
consumption roughly corresponds to increases in gross domestic product); cf U.S. DEP'T OF
ENERGY, 2009 RENEWABLE ENERGY DATA BOOK 8-9 (2010) [hereinafter RED BOOK] (showing a
roughly ten percent reduction in energy consumption following 2007 global recession).
12. E.g., RED BOOK, supra note 11, at 11 (indicating that the percentage of renewable energy
capacity, excluding renewable energy from hydropower, doubled during the 2000 to 2009 period).
13. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 1, at xx. Europe, Japan, Russia, and Canada were Kyoto
signatories and agreed to reduce carbon emissions between five and eight percent by 2012. Id.
14. See generally S. Res. 98, 105th Cong. (1997) (refusing unanimously to ratify the Kyoto
Protocol and future protocols under the UNFCCC unless all nations, including undeveloped and
developing nations like China, India, and Brazil, are subject to mandatory emission caps or
reductions).
15. See Global Change Research Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-606, 104 Stat. 3096 (codified
in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) ("[P]rovid[ing] for development and coordination of a
comprehensive and integrated United States research program .... "); National Climate Program
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2901-08 (2006) (establishing national climate program to assist with
understanding climate change); Global Climate Protection Act of 1987, 29 U.S.C. § 2901 (2006)
(identifying carbon mitigation and adaptation strategies, increasing global cooperation, and
proposing control methodologies to Congress).
16. Basic Information, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/brownfields/basic info.htm#plan (last
updated July 16, 2012) (noting that contaminated sites capable of reuse or redevelopment but for
complications with contamination exceed 450,000 nationwide).
17. See Sector Based Initiatives, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/brownfields/policy/initiatives_
sb.htm (last updated Apr. 24, 2012) (identifying ports, mines, manufacturing centers, railways, oil
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remediation and redevelopment can convert contaminated land into
useful parcels for a variety of projects from housing to recreation.' 8
However, renewable energy deployment has, in light of climate change,
proposed emission reductions, and litigation by those frustrated with the
lack of governmental action, become an increasingly important
candidate for redevelopment efforts on contaminated (and formerly
contaminated) land.1 9
Efforts to protect the public from contaminated land expanded
beyond traditional nuisance or tort 20 doctrines with the enactment of the
Comprehensive Environmental, Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act of 1980 ("CERCLA" or "Superfund"). 2' Congress enacted CERCLA
in response to catastrophic land disasters of national concern, such as
Love Canal, Valley of the Drums, and Times Beach.
This
comprehensive statutory scheme is administered by the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") with site-specific assistance

fields, and mills as primarily comprising the more than half a million contaminated sites subject to
Brownfields programs and related enforcement regimes).
18. Brownjields Success Stories, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/swerosps/bf/success/ (last updated
Mar. 9, 2012) (highlighting successful Brownfield redevelopment projects nationwide).
19. See, e.g., Siting Renewable Energy on Potentially ContaminatedLand and Mine Sites,
EPA, http://www.epa.gov/oswercpa/ (last updated July 30, 2012) (providing resources and
information regarding renewable energy deployment on contaminated land through the RePowering
America's Land Initiative, which is administered jointly by EPA and the National Renewable
Energy Laboratory).
20. See, e.g., Storley v. Armour & Co., 107 F.2d 499, 502-03 (8th Cir. 1939) (suing in
nuisance and tort to enjoin pollution of river from packing plant effluent and for damages); The
Panam, 54 F. Supp. 461,462 (D.N.J. 1944) (suing for libel due to oil spill contaminating a shore).
21. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
22. See United States v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 680 F. Supp. 546 (W.D.N.Y. 1988);
United States v. Bliss, 667 F. Supp. 1298 (E.D. Mo. 1987); JULIE KERR CASPER, CLIMATE
SYSTEMS: INTERACTIVE FORCES OF GLOBAL WARMING 136-37 (2009). Love Canal is an abandoned
Niagara Falls bypass canal in upstate New York, which became the repository of nearly forty-two
million pounds of various hazardous wastes subsequently causing significant adverse health effects
in the surrounding population. Hooker Chems., 680 F. Supp. at 549. Valley of the Drums, located on
a twenty-three acre landfill outside of Louisville, Kentucky, was the disposal site for thousands of
metal drums containing hazardous chemicals, which leeched into creeks connected to the Ohio
River and caused birth defects, neurological damage, and organ failure. JULIE KERR CASPER, supra
at 136-37. Times Beach, Missouri was contaminated with a high concentration of dioxin when waste
oil mixed with chemicals recovered from tanks used in Agent Orange production was sprayed on the
street to control ground-level dust. See Bliss, 667 F. Supp. at 1302-03; Jeff Flock, Clean-up Ends in
Toxic Town, CNN (June 26, 1997), http://www.cnn.comiUS/9706/26/times.beach/times.beach/.
These disasters catalyzed public and political support for creating a comprehensive
scheme to hold those responsible for land contamination liable for the human health effects and
environmental degradation caused by such contamination. See, e.g., Superfund: Hearings on H.R.
4571, H.R. 4566, and H.R. 5290 Before the Subcomm. on Transp. & Commerce of the H. Comm. on
Interstate & Foreign Commerce, 96th Cong. 210 (1979) (statement of Barbara Blum, Deputy
Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency); ANDREw SZAsz, ECOPOPULISM: Toxic WASTE
AND THE MOVEMENT FOR ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 51-55 (1994).
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and participation provided by other governmental bodies when
necessary.23 Congress amended CERCLA several times to address
recurrent criticism that the Superfund program was too complex, stifled
business development, and was less expeditious than the backlog of
nearly half a million contaminated sites warranted.24
This Note suggests that intelligent land use and adherence to the
Congressional goal of expediting redevelopment of contaminated land
can assist in the reduction of GHG emissions through renewable energy
deployments on these lands. By redeveloping contaminated land,
undeveloped land outside of urban and dense suburban areas can remain
5
undeveloped in an effort to curb sprawl, increase energy security,2
27 and
26
create jobs, reduce the land use footprint of renewable energy,
lessen strains on transmission infrastructure.25 Further, by encouraging
contaminated site redevelopment to incorporate decentralized renewable
energy generation, or serve as utility-scale electricity generation,
23. See 42 U.S.C. § 9606(c) (2006); Exec. Order No. 13,016, 61 Fed. Reg. 45,871 (Aug. 30,
1996) (vesting Superfund enforcement authority in various executive departments); see also
NOAA 's Implementation of CERCLA § 106 Response Authority, DAMAGE ASSESSMENT,
http://www.darrp.noaa.gov/about/106legis.html
& RESTORATION PROGRAM,
REMEDIATION,
(last updated July 19, 2010).
24. See Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act, Pub. L. No. 107118, §§ 102, 222, 115 Stat. 2356, 2356, 2370-71 (2002) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 42 U.S.C.) (adding defenses for contiguous landowners, small business owners with de micromis
contributions to site contamination, and for prospective purchasers who purchase land with
knowledge of its contamination in order to redevelop the site); Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, § 111, 100 Stat. 1613, 1642 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (increasing size of trust fund to $8.5 billion and providing new
settlement tools).
25. See Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, §§ 210-11, 92
Stat. 3117, 3135-37 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 16 and 42 U.S.C.) (mandating that
utilities purchase electricity generated by independent producers at wholesale prices, allow these
electrical generators to interconnect to the transmission grid, and wheel power to end-users). The
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission undertook electric market deregulation primarily to
facilitate the entry of new electricity producers into the market. See id This need for new electricity
producers arose primarily in response to the Arab oil embargo in the 1970s and increasing interest in
developing cleaner sources of energy to decrease American dependence on foreign energy supplies.
H.R. REP. No. 95-543, at 7 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7673, 7680 ("[Olnly by
effective conservation, reform of utility rate structure, conversion by industrial firms and utilities
from oil and natural gas ... will the United States be able to sustain its long-term economic
growth.").
26. See Patricia E. Salkin & Ashira Pelman Ostrow, Cooperative Federalism and Wind: A
New Framework for Achieving Sustainability, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1049, 1058-59 (2009)
(developing wind energy produces approximately twenty-seven and sixty-six percent more jobs than
coal and natural gas energy projects, respectively).
27. See, e.g., Uma Outka, The Renewable Energy Footprint,30 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 241,30102 (2011) (explaining renewable generation typically requires more land than conventional sources).
28. See Salkin & Ostrow, supra note 26, at 1062-63 (discussing the various benefits accruing
to the community where land use includes ground leases to renewable energy developers but
identifying concerns regarding the siting of such facilities among community stakeholders).
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America's land can also reduce accelerated contributions of GHGs in the
atmosphere caused by dependence on fossil-fuel electricity generation.29
These two seemingly disparate issues--one land-based, the other air; one
domestic, the other international-have the capacity to converge in a
mutually beneficial system driven by energy production that redevelops
contaminated land and reduces the amount of GHG emissions
contributing to global climate change. 3 °
The need for renewable energy to reduce GHG emissions, create
new jobs and technologies, 3' and provide new sources of electric
generation for ever-increasing peak demand periods converges with the
desire to remediate and reuse contaminated land in programs like the
RePowering America's Land Initiative (the "Initiative").3 2 The Initiative,
which seeks to site renewable energy projects on formerly and lightly
contaminated land, 33 appears to be a win-win program for both public
and private interests. However, it faces significant hurdles from the
complex liability scheme imposed under CERCLA, its inefficiency, and
EPA's handling of tenant liability that discourages increased
participation or independent redevelopment.3 4 In light of the pressing
need to reduce GHG emissions, redevelop contaminated land, and
achieve appreciable renewable energy deployment, a critical analysis of
the Initiative shows it to be inefficient, and reveals the antagonism of
current redevelopment policies with broader renewable energy
deployment.3 5
This Note examines how EPA construes the CERCLA liability of
developers of renewable energy projects on Brownfields,36 focusing

29. See RED BOOK, supra note 11, at 11.
30. See infra Part V.C.
31. E.g., Kate Galbraith, Study Cites Strong Green Job Growth, N.Y. TIMES: GREEN (June 10,
2009, 11:20 AM), http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/06/10/study-cites-strong-green-job-growth/
(discussing several studies showing that the number of "green" jobs is accelerating nationwide and
the majority of new clean-tech patent applications are for energy storage and renewable energy
generation).
32. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. This program, administered by the EPA with
extensive assistance from the Department of Energy's National Renewable Energy Laboratory,
encourages redevelopment of contaminated land and abandoned mine sites with renewable energy
projects when aligned with community goals for these sites.
33. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
34. See discussion infra Part Il.
35. See discussion infra Parts 11-111.
36. Brownfields, as used within this Note, will refer to lands that are contaminated, potentially
contaminated, or formerly contaminated, but will not include sites on the National Priorities List.
See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(39) (2006) (defining Brownfield as real property with reuse or development
complicated by the presence of, or a history of, contamination). The worst cases of land
contamination are subjected to Hazard Rank Scoring and included on the National Priorities List for
expedited remediation and increased oversight. Id. §§ 9605(a)(8)(B), (c)(1).
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particularly on how EPA's approach limits the opportunities for leasing
contaminated lands to competitively market renewable generated
electricity. 37 The analysis proceeds against the backdrop of climate
change and the evolution of electricity generation regulation, which has
enabled renewable energy development to catalyze land remediation and
reduce GHG emissions. Part II provides a brief background of CERCLA
with particular emphasis on the liability scheme promulgated thereunder,
and how electricity regulation has concurrently evolved to allow entry of
renewable energy developers into electricity markets independent of, and
in competition with, vertically integrated utilities. Part III evaluates how
EPA interprets tenant liability under CERCLA and demonstrates how
this interpretation creates an unacceptable tension between the need for
renewable energy deployment on contaminated sites and the ability of
developers who have not contributed to site contamination to insulate
themselves from such liability. Part IV will demonstrate how proper
construal of the liability protections provided by the Brownfields
Amendments of 2002, an aggressive program for issuing renewable
energy developers' prospective purchaser agreements, or further
amending CERCLA will adhere to the Congressional intent driving the
Brownfields Amendments and spur renewable energy deployment on
formerly contaminated sites. Part V proposes a unified program that will
facilitate renewable energy deployment and reduce GHG emissions,
including a proposed model amendment to CERCLA entitled the
RePowering America's Land Act, which grants CERCLA liability
immunization to bona fide ground tenants explored in Part IV.
II. LOCKING

THE

DOOR

AND THROWING AWAY THE KEY:

"POLLUTER PAYS" LIABILITY FORCES RENEWABLE ENERGY
OUT OF SITE AND OUT OF MIND

Deploying renewable energy projects on Brownfields is a
multifarious proposition due in large measure to the implications of
competing agency and executive department mandates, the intersection
of land-use policy with energy policy, and the market factors
38
constraining the viability of wide-scale renewable energy projects. An
understanding of the statutory scheme governing site contamination, the
history of electricity generation, and some market mechanisms

37. Compare RED BOOK, supra note 11, at 13 (identifying the average costs per megawatt of
renewable energy as falling between four and forty-three cents depending on source of generation),
with U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ELECTRIC POWER MONTHLY WITH DATA FOR OCTOBER 2012,
tbl.5.3 (Dec. 2012), http://www.eia.gov/cneaf/electricity/epa/epat7p4.html.
38. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
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impacting the economic feasibility of renewable energy generation is
necessary to recognize the benefits of renewable energy deployment on
Brownfields. 39 Indeed, such understanding may be necessary to "doubledown on clean energy," rather than "walk away" from its promise.4 °
A.

The SuperfundLaw and the Super Liability Regime to Match

Responding to several catastrophic land contamination disasters,
Congress in 1980 enacted CERCLA, which established a broad, strict
liability regime with two overriding objectives: "cleaning up hazardous
waste, and doing so at the expense of those who created it."'4 1 To ensure
these essential purposes were achieved, Congress provided that liability
would extend to a wide range of individuals and entities contributing to
contamination.42 These classes of potentially responsible parties
("PRPs") include the owners 43 and operators 44 of contaminated sites,
those who arranged for the disposal of contaminants at the site, 45 and
transporters of the hazardous material.46 Only limited defenses are
available to each class of PRP.47 Additionally, the liability scheme is
39. See infra Part II.C.
40. President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address (Jan. 24, 2012), in 158 Cong. Rec.
H151-56 (daily ed. Jan 24, 2012), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2012-0124/pdf/CREC-2012-01-24-ptI-PgHI 51-4.pdf.
41. Kelley v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co.,17 F.3d 836, 843 (6th Cir. 1994).
42. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 96-848, at 13-15 (1980) ("The goal of assuring that those who
caused chemical harm bear the costs of that harm is addressed in the reported legislation by the
imposition of liability. Strict liability, [is] the foundation of [CERCLA] ....[It is CERCLA's]
liability provisions that are the deterrent.").
43. Commander Oil Corp. v. Barlo Equip. Corp., 215 F.3d 321, 327 (2d Cir. 2000). As
discussed infra Part III, words used in CERCLA's provisions are not always what they first appear,
and liberal interpretation of terms is common to effectuate the remedial purposes of the statute in
order to promote the statute's expansive public policy focus. Id. (explaining that "owner" does not
necessarily mean title owner and can apply for the purposes of liability to lessees who attain the
requisite indicia of ownership, vis-A-vis the fee owner, to be regarded as de facto owners).
44. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) (2006); United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 65-67 (1998)
(explaining that an operator is one who manages, conducts, or directs operations specifically related
to pollution or makes decisions regarding environmental regulatory compliance).
45. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3). Arranger liability is not a pure form of strict liability in that it
requires a showing that the party entering into an agreement for disposal of hazardous waste
intended to dispose of the wastes, not merely store or move them. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry.
Co. v. United States, 556 U.S. 599, 611 (2009).
46. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4) (defining scope of transporter liability as adhering to anyone who
accepts hazardous waste for transport, incineration, or on-site storage if selected by
accepting individual).
47. See id § 9607(b) (limiting liability defenses to acts of war or god, and circumstances
where contamination was caused solely by a third party); cf H.R. REP No. 96-1016, pt. 1, at 34
(1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N 6119, 6137 ("[T]he defendant must demonstrate that he took
all precautions with respect to the particular waste that a similarly situated reasonable and prudent
person would have taken in light of all relevant facts and circumstances.").
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joint and several to avoid issues of judgment proof parties,4 8 but the

scheme also contains contribution provisions allowing for cost recovery
actions by and among PRPs.4 9

Such an expansive liability scheme is integral to achieving
CERCLA's policy goal of "polluter pays" but may have a chilling effect
on Brownfields redevelopment by private parties.50 Developers face the

risk of substantial liability when redeveloping a contaminated site, and if
existing contamination is exacerbated, even absent new contribution,
millions of dollars in clean-up costs under the "polluter pays" regime
may be at stake.51 Such factors can create significant financing gaps for
redevelopers and increase the cost of insurance, which inexorably results
in the continued, indefinite backlogging of Brownfields.52
Responding to criticism that CERCLA was failing to remediate

contaminated lands at an appropriate pace, and on a necessary scale,
Congress enacted the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act
48. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 556 U.S. at 606. However, joint and several
liability does not attach in every case-apportionment can be accomplished based on factors
demonstrated by the defendant such as: nature and duration of ownership; proof of contamination
contributed by other parties; or proof of the defendant's lack of contribution. See id (examining
existence and application of CERCLA's joint liability scheme). The Court, upon demonstration that
a reasonable basis exists to do so, may then allow apportionment of liability according to the level of
contamination by each party. See id. at 615.
49. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 9606(b)(2)(D), 9613(t)(1). The avenues of cost recovery and
contribution have been muddled through much of the last decade as a result of two holdings limiting
the procedures for instituting actions among PRPs. See Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc.,
543 U.S. 157, 160-61 (2004) (limiting contribution claims under CERCLA § 113(f)(1) to claims
instituted after the PRP has been sued in a civil action under § 107(a)). ContraUnited States v. Atl.
Research Corp., 551 U.S. 128, 131-32 (2007) (permitting cost recovery by PRPs who voluntarily
cleanup sites under § 107(a)(4)(B) and removing the near total bar for cost recovery following
voluntary cleanups caused by the Aviall decision).
50. Cf Blake A. Watson, Liberal Construction of CERCLA Under the Remedial Purpose
Canon: Have the Lower Courts Taken a Good Thing Too Far?,20 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 199, 27982 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted) (noting aggressive application to lessors, lessees,
trustees, and lenders under "owner" and "operator" provisions of CERCLA (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
51. See, e.g., U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-380, SUPERFUND: EPA's
ESTIMATED COSTS TO REMEDIATE EXISTING SITES EXCEED CURRENT FUNDING LEVELS, AND MORE
SITES ARE EXPECTED TO BE ADDED TO THE NATIONAL PRIORITIES LIST 11 (2010) [hereinafter

GAO REPORT] (calculating that more than three billion dollars had been expended to remediate
seventy-five sites and these sites still require significant investment for full remediation).
52. See Robert A. Simons & Adam Saurwein, Creative Financing of Brownfields Sites, in
BROWNFIELDS: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO REDEVELOPING CONTAMINATED PROPERTY 147, 15260 (3d ed. 2010) [hereinafter BROWNFIELDS] (noting that financing gaps can be filled with grants,

loans, in-kind services, and tax breaks, but the majority of these fillers are complicated when a
project does not require full remediation as part of the ultimate proposed project). Where financing
is secured, or not needed in the case of a highly liquid developer, insurance premiums are often
excessive because of the potential liability arising from possible contamination in the underlying
land. See William McElroy & Todd S. Davis, EnvironmentalInsurance in Brownfield Transactions,
in BROWNFELDS, supra, at 188, 190-92.
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of 1986 3 and Brownfields Amendments of 2002. 54 These amendments
strengthened liability protections available to the purchasers of
contaminated sites in order to increase the speed and scope of
Brownfield redevelopment. 55 The amendments were enacted to cut back
on liability and afford protections to innocent landowners,56 those who
contributed to site contamination in negligible amounts, 57 and developers
who purchased with knowledge of contamination but did not contribute
to, or exacerbate, existing contamination." The reasons for limiting
liability through a broader class of defenses than originally included
were largely twofold. First, the number of contaminated sites kept
growing and the Superfind 9 portion of CERCLA was rapidly depleted
when the tax-funded provision expired, thus requiring Congressional
appropriations to remain solvent.60 Second, contaminated sites would lie
idle rather than be redeveloped in order to avoid sweeping liability,
which incentivizes the development of virgin Greenfields.61 Properly
implemented and absent crabbed interpretations, the amendments to
CERCLA could greatly facilitate Brownfield redevelopment-especially
in service of renewable energy projects.

53. Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat 1613. (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.) (adding ability of PRPs to seek cost recovery in contribution actions, an innocent landowner
defense, and a de micromis exception to liability).
54. Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-118,
115 Stat. 2356 (2002) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
55. See id §§ 221-22, 115 Stat. at 2368-71. The Brownfields Amendments allowed, for the
first time, liability defenses to purchasers of contaminated property, landowners contiguous to
contaminated property, and clarified the requirements of the innocent landowner defense. A Smarter
Partnership: Removing Barriers to Brownfields Cleanups: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Env 't
& Hazardous Materials of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 107th Cong. 2 (2001)
[hereinafter A Smarter Partnership] (statement of Paul Gillmor, Chairman, H. Subcomm. on Env't
& Hazardous Materials) ("The uncertainty regarding Federal regs, extra broad Superfund liability,
and needless bureaucracy have stifled brownfield cleanups for years.").
56. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(35)(A), 9607(b)(3), (q)(1)(A) (2006).
57. Id. § 9622(g).
58. Id. §§ 9601(40), 9607(r).
59. CERCLA is commonly referred to as "Superfund" or the "Superfund law" because of a
massive fund initially established from a tax on oil and chemicals. See id. § 9611 (a).
60. See id. §§ 9631-33, repealed by Pub. L. No. 99-499, § 517(c)(1), 100 Stat. 1774 (1986)
(codified at 26 I.R.C. § 9507 (2006)); see also Steven Ferrey, Inverting the Law: Superfund
Hazardous Substance Liability and Supreme Court Reversal of All Federal Circuits, 33 WM. &
MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REv. 633, 644 (2009). Since the Superfund tax provisions have expired,
congressional appropriations have averaged $1.2 billion annually with the peak balance in 1997
reaching $5 billion before dropping to $137 million in 2009. See GAO REPORT, supra note 51, at 3.
61. See Ferrey, supra note 60, at 675-77.
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B. The Heavy Hand of Electricity Regulation and
How Renewable Energy May Be LosingIts Grip
Recent changes to energy policy removing renewable energy

incentives may also limit the feasibility of significant renewable energy
deployments on Brownfields, or elsewhere. Electric utilities have
as vertically integrated natural
been structured
traditionally
monopolies. 6' The monopoly power exerted by electric utilities across
large service territories and the resulting "Attleboro gap, 6 3 ultimately led
to the enactment of Title II of the Federal Power Act and creation of the
Federal Power Commission ("FPC"),64 now the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission ("FERC"). 65 FERC's mandate-and previously
the FPC's-is to set "just and reasonable" rates for wholesale electricity
sales and electricity transmission in interstate commerce. 66 The just and
reasonable mandate was executed for nearly a century by reliance on a
simple formula: R=B(r)+O.67 More so than the method used to calculate
equation inputs such as the value of capital, the price the formula
produced determined if FERC had achieved its mandate under § 205 of

the FPA.68 Disputes inevitably arose between various combinations of
62. See Robert S. Handmaker, Deregulatingthe Transmission of Electricity: Wheeling Under
P.UR.P.A. Sections 203, 204, and 205, 67 WASH. U. L.Q. 435, 441 (1989) (identifying that the
electricity industry is a paradigm for economies of scale realized when massive centralized stations
result in decreasing marginal costs upon increases in production). Because power plants and the
transmission network necessary to deliver electricity to the end-users is highly capital intensive, it is
not possible to have multiple entities compete to deliver electricity to end-users in the same
geographic area. Id. The result of such high-cost barriers to market entry was the granting of
monopoly licenses to electricity producers by state and local governments to exclusively serve these
geographic service territories. Id.
63. See Pub. Utils. Comm'n v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 273 U.S. 83, 84-86 (1927). The
"Attleboro gap" arose when two electrical utilities entered into an interstate wholesale power
contract, but the exigencies of the market rendered the original price misaligned with the bulk
market rate for wholesale power. Id. Because the contract was in interstate commerce, the Rhode
Island Public Utilities Commission had its order altering the contract price of the seller abrogated
under the Dormant Commerce Clause, resulting in a "gap" of governmental authority to regulate
interstate wholesale prices absent the creation of a federal statute and agency to do so. See id. at
89-90.
64. Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 824(a)-824w (2006).
65. Department of Energy Organization Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7134 (2006).
66. 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a) ("All rates and charges made, demanded, or received by any public
utility for or in connection with the transmission or sale of electric energy ... and all rules and
regulations affecting or pertaining to such rates or charges shall be just and reasonable .... ").
67. R ("Total Revenue"), B ("Rate Base"), r ("Rate of Retum"), and 0 ("Operating Costs")
were the primary tools used first by states, then by FERC, to determine the revenue requirements of
electric utilities for continued operation, economic growth, investor return, and enticement of future
investing. See Charles G. Stalon & Reinier H.J.H. Lock, State-FederalRelations in the Economic
Regulation of Energy, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 427, 437-38 (1990).
68. See, e.g., Fed. Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 602 (1944) ("If the
total effect of the rate order cannot be said to be unjust and unreasonable, judicial inquiry under the

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2014

11

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 9

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:267

FERC, ratepayers, and utilities as parties in litigation concerning costs
with most litigation focused on the dollar amount assigned the Rate Base

("B") because with the rate of return relatively static,69 the primary way
to increase profits represented by total Revenue ("R") was to inflate
capital costs.

70

The entrenchment of vertically integrated utilities began to erode
with the passage of the Public Utilities Regulatory Policy Act of 1978
("PURPA"),71 which followed the tumultuous oil embargos and energy
crisis of the 1970s.72 PURPA's goal was to increase the proliferation of
alternative fuels in the electrical market and increase cogeneration.73 To

accomplish this, the statute mandated that electric utilities purchase
electricity from Qualifying Facilities ("QFs").74 The cost mandated to

purchasers was the avoided cost of generation in absence of the supply
generated from the QF.75 An unintended consequence of PURPA, which

is significantly affecting the electricity industry even today, was the
creation of competition in the generation portion of the electricity
cycle.76 By allowing sellers to enter the market to generate power, and
mandating that investor-owner utilities ("IOUs") purchase that power,
PURPA created incentives

for the generation of electricity

from

Act is at an end. The fact that the method employed to reach that result may contain infirmities is
not then important.").
69. See Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of W. Va., 262
U.S. 679, 692-93 (1923) (explaining that the rate of return expected from a public utility is not that
gained in highly profitable or speculative ventures but rather a function of that received by similar
business in the region to sustain investor confidence and utility service).
70. See generally Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 48 U.S. 299 (1989) (challenging FERC
inclusion of only amortized costs of nuclear plant abandoned after construction when approval to
start the reactor was denied in the wake of Three Mile Island). The general rule that developed to
avoid incentivizing large over-capitalization in power plants, transmission, and distribution services
was that only equipment "used and useful" to serving end-users could be considered valid costs for
purposes of calculating the Rate Base. See generally Jonathan A. Lesser, The Used and Useful Test:
Implicationsfor a RestructuredElectric Industry, 23 ENERGY L.J. 349 (2002) (discussing the "used
and useful" test).
71. Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
16 U.S.C.).
72. Michael D. Hornstein & J.S. Gebhart Stoermer, The Energy Policy Act of 2005: PURPA
Reform, The Amendments and TheirImplications, 27 ENERGY L.J. 25, 25-26 (2006).
73. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
74. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(a) (2006); 18 C.F.R. §§ 292.201-207 (2011) (defining a QF as an
electrical generator of less than eighty megawatts, seventy-five percent of which is generated from
non fossil-fuel source inputs, or from cogeneration).
75. See 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(b)-(d), (m)(l), as amended by Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L.
No. 109-158, sec. 1253(a), 119 Stat. 594, 967 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 16 and
42 U.S.C.) (suspending mandatory purchase of QF power at avoided cost rates where the QF has
access to a competitive market, which is assumed in areas of the Northeast and Southwest).
76. See, e.g., AMY ABEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32728,
REGULATORY REFORM: ISSUES FOR THE 109TH CONGRESS 2-3 (2005).
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renewable resources.77 Authority, however, was needed to mandate the
"wheeling" of QF electricity to end-users. 78 Furthermore, IOUs could not
be forced to wheel such power absent FERC ingenuity or court
injunctions arising from anti-trust law rather than under the FPA.79
Subsequent amendments to PURPA and the FPA, contained in the
Energy Policy Act of 1992 ("EPAct of 1992',)8o permitted FERC to
mandate IOUs interconnect with QFs and Independent Power Producers
("IPPs") to wheel power to retail. 81 The cost of wheeling QF power was
to be the cost that would have been incurred by utilities to serve the same
customers.82 The structure in place after EPAct of 1992 was ideal for
renewable energy market entry-mandatory interconnection and
wheeling,83 mandated purchase of renewable energy at avoided cost
rates, 84 and access to ready markets for the electricity generated.8 5
86
However, the Energy Policy Act of 2005 ("EPAct of 2005')

significantly restricted the provisions mandating that QF produced
electricity be purchased pursuant to avoided cost pricing. Additionally,
over-capitalization in facilities previously encouraged by cost-based
regulation significantly decreased due both to deregulation and the
encouragement of competitive markets, which ironically threatened
severe under-capitalization in vital transmission assets.87 Decreases in
77. Id. at 2.
78. Stalon & Lock, supra note 67, at 457-58 (noting that "wheeling" is industry jargon for
transmission).
79. See generally Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973) (refusing to
wheel Bureau of Reclamation electricity purchased in bulk by municipal power companies was
monopolistic behavior undertaken to prevent the municipal power companies from servicing
61,095 (1988) (conditioning merger approval
customers); Utah Power & Light Co., 45 FERC
between two electric utilities upon agreement to supply transmission to potential competitors).
80. Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2, 15,
16, 30, 42, and 43 U.S.C.).
81. See 16 U.S.C. § 824i-j (2006), as amended by Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No.
109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 16 and 42 U.S.C.).
82. See 18C.F.R. §§292.301-.304(2011).
83. See, e.g., Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory
Transmission Services by Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540, 21,541
(1996) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pts. 35 & 385) (explaining that after the passage of EPAct of 1992,
FERC began exploring ways that it could inject stronger competition into the electricity market and
reinterpreted the FPA to allow functional unbundling-separation of transmission and generationwhich would allow market side competition for all generators including IPPs who were not QFs, in
part by mandating such wheeling).
84. See 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3.
85. See RED BOOK, supra note 11, at 8-9 (analyzing energy consumption and generation of
approximately one hundred quadrillion British Thermal Units domestically).
86. Energy Policy Act of 2005, 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3 (2006).
87. See Joshua J. Franklin, Upgradingthe National Power Grid: Electric CompaniesNeed an
Economic Incentive to Invest in New Technology, 31 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TEC-I. L.J. 159, 17475, 179-81 (2004) (discussing the Northeast blackout of August 14, 2003, which left more than fifty
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spending on transmission exposes the electrical grid to the increased
possibility of blackouts and instability, which renewable energy
deployment on select Brownfields can alleviate based on careful site
selection. 88 Also extinguished is the advantage renewable energy
generation enjoyed relative to fossil fuel generation prior to enactment of
the EPAct of 2005.89 Preferential treatment for renewable energy
deployment, including continued production tax credits, may be
necessary for the continued short-term viability of electricity from
renewables in competitive markets. 9°
C. Renewable Energy on Brownfields Saves Dollars and Makes Sense
Climate change has the potential to impact nearly every aspect of
American life and touch upon each member of the population.9" The
changes in industry, agriculture, land-use, and health care precipitated by
even small increases in the average global temperature could be farreaching, with mitigation and adaptation costs approaching two trillion
dollars annually. 92 Though there exists continued resistance to the
acceptance of climate change by some, the scientific community
advocates in almost total unison for a comprehensive, global mitigation
and adaptation policy. 93 Because fossil-fuel combustion for electricity
generation is the largest stationary source category for carbon emissions,

million people without power due to overburdening of the electrical transmission grid caused by a
power surge and identifying the lack of incentives after PURPA and EPAct of 1992 for utilities to
invest in transmission infrastructure).
88. See Steven Ferrey, Exit Strategy: State Legal Discretion to Environmentally Sculpt the
DeregulatingElectric Environment, 26 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 109, 116-17 (2002) (proposing that
renewable energy deployment will tend to lead to smaller generation with greater proximity to enduse, which will require less transmission thereby allowing generation to substitute, rather than
merely complement, transmission services in the electric cycle); cf Piedmont Envtl. Council v.
FERC, 558 F.3d 304, 309-10 (4th Cir. 2009) (holding that FERC lacks authority to issue siting
permits for regional transmission lines when opposed by states and signaling a major impediment to
national efforts at fortifying already strained transmission resources).
89. Cf RED BOOK, supra note 11, at 46, 59, 69 (showing that the increase in renewable
energy deployment, and decrease in renewable energy prices, were slowed in the period
immediately following 2005, when compared to the period immediately preceding 2005).
90.

Cf U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2011 WITH PROJECTIONS TO

2035 75 figs.80-81 (2011), available at http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/pdf/0383(2011).pdf
[hereinafter ENERGY OUTLOOK] (highlighting that the levelized cost of wind is only one cent per
kilowatt hour lower than coal-fired electrical generation units and nearly four cents per kilowatt
higher than less capital intensive natural gas fired generation units).
91. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
92. See, e.g., FRANK ACKERMAN & ELIZABETH A. STANTON, NATURAL RES. DEF. COUNCIL,
THE COST OF CLIMATE CHANGE: WHAT WE'LL PAY IF GLOBAL WARMING GOES UNCHECKED

2 tbl.1 (2008).
93. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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it is increasingly clear that energy policy is climate policy.94 To begin
stabilizing and ultimately reducing GHG emissions, annual emission
increases must be offset by deployment of renewable energy generation,
which emit negligible amounts of GHGs relative to fossil-fuel sources
of electricity. 95
Though the global community has failed thus far to create a
comprehensive and enforceable scheme for GHG reductions, and the
United States has stalled in adopting a comprehensive energy and
climate policy,97 recent legal challenges against large GHG emitters and
EPA have created incentives for the private sector to reduce carbon
emissions 98 as GHGs are now under the purview of the CAA after EPA
decisions borne of Massachusetts v. EPA. 99 Because they are regulated
by the CAA, GHGs must be inventoried and reported, 0 0 as well as

controlled' 0' at major stationary sources, adding to the transaction and

94. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, U.S. CLIMATE ACTION REPORT 2010: FIFTH NATIONAL
COMMUNICATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA UNDER THE UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK
CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE 13, 26-28 tbl.3-5 (2010) [hereinafter FIFTH CLIMATE REPORT],
availableat http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/natc/usa-nc5.pdf.
95. See id at 29, 32, 76.
96. See Lisa Schenck, Climate Change "Crisis"-Struggling for Worldwide Collective
Action, 19 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 319, 334-37 (2008) (discussing the Kyoto Protocol's
failure to include enforceable caps for several of the world's largest GHG emitters, which implicates
the free-rider problem and exacerbates the collective action problem for mobilizing carbon emission
reduction efforts on a global scale).
97. Indeed, the United States has failed to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, allowed the WaxmanMarkey Bill to die in Congress, and has exerted Herculean efforts to avoid international and
domestic obligations for reducing GHG emissions. See American Clean Energy and Security Act of
2009, H.R. 2454, 11 1th Cong (2009); Bill Summary & Status: 1 lth Congress (2009-2010): lL.R.
2454:
Major
Congressional
Actions,
LIBR.
CONGRESS,
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/bdquery/z?dl 1l:HR02454:@@@R (last visited Feb. 7, 2013) (passing House with 219 to 212
vote but left on the Senate floor without debate); see also Patrick Parenteau, Anything Industir
Wants: Environmental Policy Under Bush 11, 14 DUKE ENVT'L L. & POL'Y F. 363, 368 (2004)
(attacking the Bush administration for Enron-like "accounting gimmick[s]" for attempting to meet
the non-binding reductions of the Rio Conference, which created the UNFCCC).
98. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. Recent litigation has resulted in some success
in prompting GHG regulation. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 528-29 (2007) (holding that
carbon dioxide is an "air pollutant" within the meaning of § 202(a) of the Clean Air Act). By
holding that GHGs are air pollutants under the CAA, a cascade of determinations and rulemakings
were necessitated in the wake of Massachusetts v. EPA. See, e.g., Prevention of Significant
Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514, 31,514 (June 3,
2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R pts. 51, 52, 70, and 71); Endangerment and Cause or Contribute
Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496,
66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 1).
99. See sources cited supra note 98.
100. Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gases, 74 Fed. Reg. 56,260, 56,266 (Oct. 30, 2009)
(to be codified in scattered parts of 40 C.F.R.) (requiring large sources across various industrial
sectors to report GHG emissions to EPA).
101. See, e.g., Petition Requesting that the Administrator Object to the Issuance of the Final
Revised Title V Operating Permit at 5, 10 In re Louisville Gas & Elec. (E.P.A. Apr. 29, 2008)
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10 2
operating costs of electric generation and transmission facilities.
Industries falling within the ambit of CAA or regional 10 3 carbon
regulation will increasingly look for methods to curb reported emissions
to achieve future reduction credits, 10 4 to 10 avoid
a negative public
6
image,' 5' and to avoid energy input volatility.
While federal action has been prompted from influential judicial
decisions, states are addressing the need for renewable energy through
various mechanisms of their own design. The most widespread and
promising state employed mechanisms are Renewable Portfolio
Standards ("RPSs") 10 7 utilizing Renewable Energy Certificates

("RECs"),I0 8 and Feed in Tariffs ("FITs").

°9

An RPS is a mandated mix

of electrical generation facilities represented as a total capacity output by
source type (renewable versus fossil fuel).,l 0 A REC is a certificate
specifying how much energy a utility generates from renewable
resources and ultimately delivers to an end-user." 1 Attainment of a REC

(No. 21-223-002), 2008 WL 8277210 (requesting Best Available Control Technology to reduce
amount of carbon emissions from electric generation facility).
102. See Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gases, 74 Fed. Reg. at 56,363 tbl.VII-1
(estimating that the reporting and compliance costs of reporting GHG emissions to be nearly thirty
million dollars across approximately 3000 covered electrical generation facilities).
103. See
Program
Design,
REGIONAL
GREENHOUSE
GAS
INITIATIVE,
http://www.rggi.org/design (last visited Feb. 7, 2013) (identifying that the Regional Greenhouse Gas
Initiative operates a carbon cap and trade system in the Northeast with periodic auctions for carbon
emission credits that can then be traded to ensure sector caps, enforced by participating states
according to state law, are not exceeded). The Western Climate Initiative is a similar program
operating in the western United States and portions of Canada. See Program Design, W. CLIMATE
INITIATIVE,
http ://www.westemclimateinitiative.org/designing-the-program
(last
visited
Feb. 7, 2013).
104. See generally American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 11 1th Cong.,
(2009) (creating cap and trade program for the United States with reduction credits considered for
legacy reductions and implemented efficiency programs).
105. See, e.g., CARBON DISCLOSURE PROJECT, CDP GLOBAL 500 REPORT 2011:
ACCELERATING Low CARBON GROWTH 7, 56-73 (2011) (listing emissions of Fortune 500
companies voluntarily submitting such data to garner public support from emission transparency).
106. Ferrey, supra note 88, at 117, 124 (stating that unlike fossil fuel electricity generation,
most renewable energy sources do not require source inputs, which are subject to price volatility,
embargos, and transportation needs because the sun and wind are free, plentiful, and
globally distributed).
107. See Patrick Jacobi, Renewable Portfolio Standard GeneratorApplicability Requirements:
How States Can Stop Worrying and Learn to Love the Dormant Commerce Clause, 30 VT. L. REV.
1079, 1089-90 (2006).
108. Joel B. Eisen, The Environmental Responsibility of the Regionalizing Electric Utility
Industry, 15 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 295, 308 (2005).
109.

KARLYNN

CORY ET

AL.,

NAT'L RENEWABLE

ENERGY

LAB.,

TECHNICAL

NREL/TP-6A2-45549, FEED-N TARIFF POLICY: DESIGN, IMPLEMENTATION,

REPORT

AND RPS POLICY

INTERACTIONS 2 (2009).

110. See Jacobi, supra note 107, at 1090.
111. See Eisen, supra note 108, at 308.
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is typically used to satisfy the RPS standard for IOUs, even though the
electricity generated was from electrical plants owned by third parties.12
State RPS programs compel the private energy sector to avoid fines
and forfeiture of tax incentives by meeting the imposed standard." 3
Therefore, the proliferation of such programs will increase the private
sector demand for renewable energy. By comparison, a FIT focuses not
on a mandated quota of renewable energy on the demand side, but rather
on creating a market for renewable energy by encouraging increases on
the supply side.' 14 Renewable energy supply and demand is not created
solely by the threat of loss, but instead by the guarantee of a robust
market for renewable-generated electricity."1 5 FITs adopted abroad have
been very successful more than doubling the amount of electricity
generated from renewables and creating the potential for more than
three-quarters of domestic need to be satisfied from these sources.1 6 A
FIT and an RPS are not mutually exclusive, but rather could together far
surpass renewable
electricity gains realized from using either
17
in isolation.'
Renewable energy generation deployed on contaminated and
remediated land has the potential to solve multiple environmental and
energy issues simultaneously. Siting renewable energy projects on8
contaminated lands guarantees reuse of some urban and blighted land," 1
reduces the footprint of renewable energy,' 19 eases strain on electric
transmission resources, 20 and reduces carbon emissions.12 1 Renewable
energy deployment on Brownfields can also insulate the projects from
112. See Wheelabrator Lisbon, Inc. v. Conn. Dep't of Pub. Util. Control, 531 F.3d 183, 184-85
(2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (allowing the state public utility commission to transfer RECs produced
by renewable energy generators to utilities actually distributing the power to end-users).
113. See Jacobi, supra note 107, at 1090.
114. CORY ET AL.,supra note 109, at 8.
115. See id. at 13.

116. Christoph H. Stefes, The German Solution: Feed-In Tariffs, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 21, 2011,
5:42 PM), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/09/20/why-isnt-the-us-a-leader-in-greentechnology/us-should-emulate-germanys-renewable-energy-model
(utilizing twenty-year feed-in
tariffs allowed Germany to increase the amount of energy from renewable sources from less than
five percent in 1991 to more than twenty percent in 2011).
117. CORYETAL.,supranote 109, at 10-11, 13.
118.

Cf John R. Nolon & Jessica Bacher, Zoning and Land Use Planning, 37 REAL EST. L.J.

234, 237-41 (2008) (identifying characteristics of blight including the presence of pollution on land
in need of redevelopment to contribute to urban renewal).
119. See Outka, supra note 27, at 297-98 (identifying studies estimating the available land
savings from reusing land for energy projects as between two and eight million acres).
120. See id. at 302 (highlighting the advantages of on-site and near end-use energy production
to alleviate capacity constraints on the electrical grid).
121. See id. at 287-88 (identifying scholarly debate centering on the notion that energy land use
planning will reduce carbon emissions from avoiding development of land as sinks and increasing
renewable deployment).
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NIMBY12 2 challenges, thus reducing the transaction costs caused by
litigation and adding to the certainty that the project will be
completed. 2 3 Because solar and wind deployments do not result in
significant emissions of carbon or other pollutants, 124 environmental
justice issues are, like NIMBY opposition, largely neutralized.

25

No

longer is the need for additional energy and the desire to protect the
environment a Buridan's Ass paradox- 2 6 -such needs and desires are not
mutually exclusive.

Unlike

fossil-fuel

generation

facilities,

renewable

energy

deployments are sited overwhelmingly on leased land, rather than on
land owned by the generator in fee. 127 Leases are preferable to owning
land in fee when deploying wind and solar technologies for two primary

reasons. First, utility-scale wind and solar deployments are highly capital
intensive on the front end of the project, whereas fossil fuel plants are
capital intensive on the back end because of the costs of fuel, extraction
and transportation, and environmental reporting. 128 This economic reality

requires renewable projects to have as low an initial capital cost as
possible in order to gain and maintain financing from inception to
completion.

29

Second, utility-scale deployments (as well as smaller,

decentralized projects) allow for underlying use of the land chosen for
development, which reduces land costs and allows continued use for

122. "NIMBY" is an acronym for "not in my backyard," used to refer to those who challenge
renewable energy projects because of environmental, wildlife preservation, and aesthetic concerns.
Salkin & Ostrow, supra note 26, at 1052.
123. By siting such projects on Brownfields, many of the NIMBY arguments are neutralized,
because a Brownfield is unlike Nantucket Sound, Yosemite Valley, or other prized locales, which
may stir community opposition to development of the parcel in question. See id at 1070.
124. See Ferrey, supra note 88, at 124.
125. Sariyah S. Buchanan, Why Marginalized Communities Should Use Community Benefit
Agreements as a Tool for EnvironmentalJustice: Urban Renewal andBrownfield Redevelopment in
Philadelphia,Pennsylvania, 29 TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 31, 40 (2010) (explaining that

environmental justice focuses on the inequity arising when the poor are disproportionately located
within close proximity of Brownfields, power plants, and other installations that threaten
individual health).
126. Margaret Levi et al., Introduction to THE LIMITS OF RATIONALITY 7 (1990) (discussing
the Buridan's Ass paradox inspired by Aristotle's De Caelo, where an ass is placed equidistant
between a haystack and pail of water, and because equally hungry and thirsty, is unable to choose
one alternative over another, resulting in death from thirst and starvation).
127.

AM. WIND ENERGY ASSOC., WIND ENERGY SITING HANDBOOK

2.1.2 at 2-4 (2008)

(indicating that, for example, wind projects are usually set-up on leased land).
128. JOHN P. HARPER ET AL., ERNEST ORLANDO LAWRENCE BERKELEY NAT'L LAB., LBNL63434, WIND PROJECT FINANCING STRUCTURES: A REVIEW & COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS i (2007),

available at http://eetd.lbl.gov/ea/emp/reports/63434.pdf (analyzing the finance structures utilized
for wind energy).
129. Id.at48.
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farming,13 ° parking,13' landfills, 13 2 or continued remediation when sited
on contaminated land. 133 Such leases typically last for twenty to thirty
years to support secured financing through power purchase
agreements 134 and create a severable right to sun or air, grant access
to
easements for maintenance, and require the underlying landowner 13
units. 1
generation
electrical
sited
with
interfering
refrain from
Recognition by governments that underlying uses can be maintained
while deploying renewable energy projects has prompted the opening of
government lands for renewable energy leases, thereby allowing
fulfillment of renewable 137energy quotas 136 without capital expenditures
by the government itself.

In addition, contaminated sites allow renewable energy producers to
offset the loss of government subsidies 138 for renewable power with
those provided to redevelop Brownfields. 139 These redevelopment
130. See RED BOOK, supra note 11, at 63; Groundbreaking Ceremony for the 205.5 MW
10, 2010), http://www.enxco.com/about/press/
Lakefield Wind Project, EDF (Nov.
groundbreakingceremony for the 205.5 mw lakefield windprojectl (announcing two hundred
plus megawatt wind energy deployment on more than twenty thousand acres of farmland in
Minnesota). Because the average output of modem wind turbines is between 1.5 and 3.5 megawatts,
in order for a wind farm to compete with fossil fuel plants, hundreds of turbines must be deployed
with hundreds of meters spacing between. RED BOOK, supranote 11, at 63.
131. John Collins Rudolf, The ParkingLot as 'Solar Grove,' N.Y. TIMES: GREEN (July 6,2010,
4:28 PM), http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/07/06/the-parking-lot-as-solar-grove/.
132. Mike Breslin, Bright Idea-Solar Power over Landfills, AMERICAN RECYCLER (June
2011), http://www.americanrecycler.com/0611/971bright.shtml (identifying nearly one hundred
thousand closed municipal landfill sites nationwide with the potential for flexible
membrane solar generation to both cap landfills and provide municipalities with revenue from the
electricity generated).
133. See generally GABRIEL SAMPSON, OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE & EMERGENCY RESPONSE,
EPA, SOLAR POWER INSTALLATIONS ON CLOSED LANDFILLS: TECHNICAL AND REGULATORY

CONSIDERATIONS (2009) (discussing solar power systems); Success Stories and Case Studies on
Siting Renewable Energy Contaminated Land and Mine Sites, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/
renewableenergyland/successstories.htm (last updated May 16, 2012) [hereinafter Success Stories].
134. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY ET AL., DOEfEE-0307, GUIDE TO PURCHASING GREEN
POWER: RENEWABLE ELECTRICITY, RENEWABLE ENERGY CERTIFICATES, AND ON-SITE
RENEWABLE GENERATION 25-26 (2010) [hereinafter GREEN GUIDE].

135. See generally Michelle M. McAtee & Vito M. Pacione, What You Should Know About
Wind Farms,PRAC. REAL EST. LAW., May 2009, at 21 (discussing wind farms).
136. See Energy Policy Act of 2005, 42 U.S.C. § 15852 (2006) (requiring not less than 5% of
energy used by the federal government between 2010 and 2012 be from renewable sources and not
less than 7.5% in subsequent years); Exec. Order No. 13,423, 72 Fed. Reg. 3919 (Jan. 26, 2007)
(requiring that fewer than half of renewable energy generation required by EPAct of 2005 be from
"new" sources and when feasible, these sources should be sited on federal land).
137. See GREEN GUIDE, supra note 134, at 26.
138. See 26 I.R.C. § 45(a) (2006) (allowing renewable energy producers eligible for electricity
production tax credit to opt for treasury grant of up to $200 per kilowatt plus 30% real estate
deduction and 10% equipment deduction in lieu of 1.1 cents per kilowatt hour for solar
technologies, or 2.2 cents per kilowatt hour for wind and biomass).
139.

See generally EPA, A GUIDE TO FEDERAL TAX INCENTIVES FOR BROWNFIELDS
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incentives combined with cost savings from leasing land could maintain
renewable energy's competitiveness by keeping the cost per megawatt
produced nearer to that of natural gas and coal. 40 However, this elegant
interaction of energy, land, and air is discouraged by several EPA
actions described below, which establish a wall between the Agency and
private developers. 41 Erected to alleviate administrative burdens and
protect power-neither a true threat-to enforce CERCLA, this wall
prevents the realization of a scenario where half a million contaminated
sites is reduced by private redevelopment for renewable energy projects.
III. I'D Do ANYTHING FOR LOVE (BUT I WON'T Do THAT):
EPA'S RELATIONSHIP WITH RENEWABLE ENERGY
DEPLOYMENT ON BROWNFIELDS

The advantages of siting renewable energy projects on Brownfields
have not escaped the attention of developers or EPA.142 However,
governmental programs to develop renewable energy on Brownfields do
not adequately address redevelopment considering the scope of the
problem or the amount of renewable energy needed to compete
meaningfully with fossil-fuel generation. 43 The scale of such programs
is often circumscribed intentionally, merely attempting to show
feasibility, but Agency interpretations of CERCLA also indirectly, but
powerfully, limit the efficacy of the program's goals, even where
feasibility is demonstrated. '44 Further, Agency reticence to definitively
foreclose much of the liability faced by private Brownfield redevelopers
inhibits the promise of renewable energy deployments on these sites and
leaves the door open for courts to find liability despite the best intentions
45
of Agency guidance to the contrary.

REDEVELOPMENT (2011) (cataloging federal and state tax incentives and grants for Brownfield

redevelopment including those for renewable energy deployment).
140. See ENERGY OUTLOOK, supra note 90, at 75 & fig.81, 77 (projecting that by 2020 and
2035, costs of renewable energy will become lower than fossil fuels due in part to regulatory
uncertainty of fossil fuel plants, higher fuel costs, incentives for renewables, and lower capital costs
for renewables).
141. See discussion infra Part iI.B.
142. See discussion infra Part III.A.
143. See FIFTH CLIMATE REPORT, supranote 94, at 14 (noting domestic renewable electricity
consumption in 2008 accounted for 3% of consumption-coal and natural gas approximately 48%).
144. See infra Part LI.A-B.
145. See infra Part II.B-C.
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A.

The RePoweringAmerica's LandInitiative and the
Potentialto Kill Two Dirty Birds with One Stone

The EPA, in a joint effort with the Department of Energy's National
Renewable Energy Laboratory ("NREL"), created the Initiative in
September 2008 to begin addressing the intersection of renewable
energy and contaminated sites. 146 The Initiative aims to identify
Brownfields, Superfund sites, and abandoned landfill or mine sites,
which have wind, solar, geothermal, or biomass development
potential. 147 EPA estimates the number of contaminated sites nationwide
to be roughly 500,000, and efforts in conjunction with NREL have
identified 11,000 sites, spanning in excess of 15 million acres, which are
48 After
reviewing
suitable for renewable energy deployment. 1
applications solicited in early 2011, the agencies in November 2011,
released 26 feasibility studies assessing contaminated sites located in 21
149
The
states, which are suitable for renewable energy deployments.
majority of sites identified are categorized as suitable for solar (21), but
also include those suited for biomass (7), wind (6), and geothermal
(2).' 50 Generation facilities constructed within the ambit of the Initiative
51
account for a generating capacity of less than 80 megawatts.'
Tempering the excitement of such deployments is the fact that the output
generating capacity from only
from these projects is roughly 10% of the
52
plant.1
power
central
coal-fired
new
one
While the goals of the Initiative are laudable, the feasibility of
facilitating significant redevelopment of contaminated sites solely with
146. See NAT. RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., NREL'TP-6A20-50898, GUIDE FOR IDENTIFYING
AND CONVERTING HIGH-POTENTIAL PETROLEUM BROWNFIELD SITES TO ALTERNATIVE FUEL

STATIONS 1 (2011); Siting Renewable Energy on Potentially ContaminatedLand and Mine Sites,
EPA, http://www.epa.gov/renewableenergyland/ (last updated Oct. 31, 2012) (explaining that the
goal of the joint effort is to identify contaminated and remediated land that can support renewable
energy projects and highlight the viability of such projects for state and private developers).
147. See, e.g., NAT. RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., supra note 146, at 1, 3, 7-8 (2011) (outlining
the steps NREL will take to identify and rate possible Brownfield sites for renewable energy
deployment based on size, location, and type of generating source).
148. FrequentlyAsked Questions on Renewable Energy on ContaminatedLand and Mine Sites,
EPA, http://www.epa.gov/renewableenergyland/faq info.htm (last updated Nov. 4, 2011).
149. E.g., EPAINREL FeasibilityStudies, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/oswercpa/studies.htm (last
updated May 16, 2012).
150. Id. (discussing the various sites in attached materials).
151. Success Stories, supra note 133 (listing the projects completed, consisting of seven
generation facilities ranging in capacity from one megawatt to the thirty-five megawatt
Steel Winds project).
152.

See KEITH BURNARD & SANKAR BHATTACHARYA, POWER GENERATION FROM COAL:

ONGOING DEVELOPMENTS AND OUTLOOK 13 (2011) (evaluating deployment of supercritical coal
generation plants worldwide, which range from 400 megawatts to 1100 megawatts with the majority
generating approximately 800 megawatts).
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the Initiative, or in conjunction with state Brownfield redevelopment
programs, is unrealistic.' 53 Though EPA and NREL have stated that the
program's goal is to "demonstrate the potential that contaminated land
provides for developing renewable energy,"'' 54 the question naturally
arises-is there an actual need for such demonstration, or is the potential
for such projects already glaringly clear? 55 With nearly 500,000 sites in
various stages of contamination, the identification and evaluation of less
than 30 sites per year simply will not achieve the dual purposes of the
program on a sufficient scale. 56 Nor will the addition of approximately
82 megawatts of renewable generating capacity to curb the construction
of additional fossil fuel electricity generation facilities satisfy the energy
demand of nearby residents or ultimately contribute to a reduction in
carbon emissions in a meaningful way. 157
Additionally, very high transaction costs inhere in mobilizing
multilateral agency action on a nationwide or even statewide scale.
Transaction costs in this context arise from rallying community
support, 58 identifying sites,' 59 and preparing Environmental Impact
Statements when needed. 60 Though such transaction costs exist in
153. Compare id. (calculating that the average output of supercritical coal plants being
developed is roughly eight hundred megawatts), with Success Stories, supra note 133 (noting that
the total nameplate capacity of all completed Initiative projects listed is less than eighty megawatts).
154. EPA OSWER CTR. FOR PROGRAM ANALYSIS, DATA GUIDELINES FOR "RENEWABLE
ENERGY GENERATION POTENTIAL ON EPA AND STATE TRACKED SITES" MAPS 2 (2010),

available at http://www.epa.gov/renewableenergyland/maps/epa~tracked-sites data guidelines.pdf.
(emphasis added).
155. E.g., RED BOOK, supra note 11, at 111-12 (discussing clean energy investments in recent
years with domestic investment in renewable energy reaching nine billion dollars in 2009, of which,
three billion was directed to solar and wind energy deployments); cf EPA OSWER CTR. FOR
PROGRAM ANALYSIS, supra note 154, at 2 (noting the many benefits of using contaminated land and
mind sites for renewable energy purposes).
156. Compare EPAINREL Feasibility Studies, supra note 149, with BURNARD &
BHATTACHARYA, supra note 152, at 13.

157. Seth Bornstein, Biggest Jump Ever Seen in Global Warming Gases, ASSOCIATED PRESS
FIN. WIRE, Nov. 9, 2011, available at 2011 WL 27320360 (reporting on a six percent increase in
GHG emissions totaling over five hundred million tons from increased coal generation in the
developing world).
158. See generally Howard C. Landau, Building Consensusfor the Project, in BROWNFIELDS,
supra note 52, at 182-87 (providing a detailed analysis of common Brownfields redevelopment steps
from communication with community stakeholders and media to arranging for public hearings with
ancillary delays to the project).
159. See Outka, supra note 27, at 269-70 (explaining that the dominance of local interest in
plant siting and ability for local interests to be heard in the siting process may create significant
impediments to ultimately developing a needed facility unless removed from population zones).
160. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (2006). The National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA") requires
agencies to compile an Environmental Impact Statement ("EIS") for "major Federal actions
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment" including "adverse environmental
effects," "alternatives," and any "commitments of resources" to the proposed action or legislation.
Id. Environmental groups, despite the benefits of renewable energy deployment, use the NEPA
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private transactions, the quantitative impact could potentially be less
among private parties who could execute remediation on shorter
timeframes 16 1 and can create economies of scale not realized by the
Initiative. EPA's expenditures, in both time and money, are best
allocated to oversight and approval of responsible
162 private party
mandate.
its
of
enforcement
general
to
and
transactions
B. Do as I Say, Not as IDo: How EPA GuidanceRegarding
Renewable Energy Deployments on Brownfields Is Incoherent in Light of
GroundLease Prevalence
Included expressly to reduce the liability developers faced when
attempting to redevelop contaminated lands, 163 the Bona Fide
Prospective Purchaser ("BFPP") provision added to CERCLA by the
Brownfields Amendments was written to apply to both owners and
tenants. 164 The BFPP provision provides a defense to CERCLA liability
conditioned upon a purchaser or lessee making all appropriate
inquiries 165 prior to the purchase or lease of a contaminated site and
166
causing no new contaminant discharges after the purchase or lease.
The inclusion of the BFPP provision in CERCLA was seen as a vehicle
to allow increased Brownfield redevelopment by reducing the chilling
effect caused by expansive liability. 167 However, EPA's adoption of two
key policy positions erects significant barriers to the private
process to challenge proposals conflicting with organizational preferences much to the detriment of
more rapid renewable energy deployment. See W. Watersheds Project v. Bureau of Land Mgmt.,
774 F. Supp. 2d 1089, 1091, 1093-94 (D. Nev. 2011) (challenging approval of wind energy facility);
see also Domenic A. Cossi, Getting Our Priorities Straight: Streamlining NEPA to Hasten
Renewable Energy Development on Public Land, 31 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REv. 149, 154
(2010) (describing the purpose and process of developing an EIS).
161. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, CBO MEMORANDUM: ANALYZING THE DURATION OF CLEANUP
AT SITES ON SUPERFUND'S NATIONAL PRIORITIES LIST 2, 7-10 (1994) (estimating the average

cleanup time of Superfund sites to be between thirteen and fifteen years with some estimated to
require up to forty years for completion).
162. See GAO REPORT, supra note 51, at 19-21 (concluding that the cost to remediate
sites on the National Priorities List will far exceed both EPA estimates for those sites and
corresponding appropriations).
163. A Smarter Partnership, supra note 55, at 1-2 (statement of Paul Gillmor, Chairman, H.
Subcomm. on Env't & Hazardous Materials).
164. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(40) ("The term 'bona fide prospective purchaser' means a person (or a
tenant of a person) that acquires ownership of a facility after January 11, 2002 ....
165. 40 C.F.R. § 312.20 (2010).
166. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(40). The provision defines the new class able to avoid CERCLA
liability as: "a person (or a tenant of a person) that acquires ownership of a facility after January 11,
2002, and that establishes each of the following by a preponderance of the evidence" rather than
adopting language providing liability protections to "a tenant of that person," or "their tenant." Id.
167. See A Smarter Partnership,supra note 55, at 2 (statement of Paul Gillmor, Chairman, H.
Subcomm. on Env't & Hazardous Materials).
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redevelopment of contaminated sites by renewable energy developers.
First, EPA has incorrectly interpreted the Brownfields Amendments by
limiting the liability protections afforded to tenants to situations where
their protection is either derivative as to a fee owner, or where the tenant
has sufficient indicia of ownership to be regarded as if the tenant were a
fee owner. 168 Second, EPA construes the statute to be self-executing,
which reinforces a longstanding policy to refrain from issuing
Prospective Purchaser/Lessor Agreements ("PPAs") to private parties in
transactions for the redevelopment of contaminated sites. 169 Though the
Agency does not completely bar the issuance of PPAs, the circumstances
under which they actively issue PPAs are extremely limited. 170 The small
number of PPAs issued attests to the stringency of PPA requirements,
which together with EPA's statutory interpretation frustrates renewable
energy developers' Brownfield siting significantly.171
Interpreting the BFPP provisions to allow tenants only derivative
liability protection if the fee owner qualifies as a BFPP, or when the
tenant has acquired sufficient indicia of ownership, renders the
parenthetical inclusion of tenants nugatory. 172 Such interpretation is
patently at odds with canons of general statutory interpretation and the
168. See EPA, ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION GUIDANCE REGARDING APPLICABILITY OF THE
BONA FIDE PROSPECTIVE PURCHASER DEFINITION IN CERCLA SECTION 101(40) TO TENANTS:
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 1 (2009) [hereinafter BFPP FAQS].
169. Id. at 4. A PPA is an agreement entered into between the developer and EPA (with
Attorney General approval) in order to facilitate contaminated site redevelopment by specifically
stating the extent of contamination, planned enforcement actions, and steps necessary for the
developer to avoid CERCLA liability. See Memorandum from Barry Breen, Dir., Office of Site
Remediation Enforcement and Bruce Gelber, Chief, Envtl. Enforcement Section, Envtl. & Natural
Res. Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice to Superfund Senior Policy Managers (Regions I-X) et al. 2 & n.2,
5-7 (Jan. 10, 2001) [hereinafter PPA Memo]; see also Memorandum from Barry Breen, Dir. Office
of Site Remediation Enforcement to Superfund Senior Policy Managers (Regions I-X) and Regional
Counsels (Regions I-X) 1-2 (May 31, 2002) [hereinafter BFPP Memo] (stating that since the
Brownfields Amendments outline the steps necessary for BFPP liability protection to attach, PPAs
are rendered "unnecessary").
170. See BFPP Memo, supra note 169, at 4-5 (considering issuance of PPAs where the
windfall lien on a site would preclude financing, the land to be purchased is owned by a third party
engaged in CERCLA litigation and would likely sue the purchaser, or where significant
environmental benefits would be derived, which is determined on an ad hoc, site-specific basis).
171. See PPA Memo, supra note 169, at 2 (noting that only 140 PPAs were issued prior
to 2000).
172. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 9601(40) (2006) ("The term 'bona fide prospective purchaser'
means a person (or tenant of a person) that acquires ownership of a facility ....
(emphasis
added)), with id. § 9607(r) ("[A] bona fide prospective purchaser whose potential liability for a
release or threatened release is based solely on the purchaser's being considered to be an owner or
operator of a facility shall not be liable .... " (emphasis added)). Indeed, the interplay between the
liability provision for BFPPs and the definitional provision for BFPPs would make the disjunctive in
the liability provision useful only if in some way a fee owner could not be considered the fee owner
of a particular site. See id. § 9607(r).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol41/iss1/9

24

Nasca: Just Scratching the Surface: How EPA Denied Renewable Energy Deve

20121

REPOWERING AMERICA "SCONTAMINA TED LAND

specific canons that courts attach to interpretation issues arising under
CERCLA.'73 EPA's flawed interpretation of the provision functionally
alters the definition of a BFPP from including a "tenant" of a "person,"
to a BFPP being a "tenant" of a "BFPP.' ' 174 Further, provisions
explaining the liability exemptions for BFPPs provide that liability
would not attach "based solely on the purchaser's being considered an
owner or operator," a disjunctive purporting to provide protection
directly to tenants. 175 Otherwise, given the narrow view of "owner" in
§ 107(a)(1), incorporated by reference, which attaches liability to a
and operator, "operator" as used in § 107(r)
person who is an owner
76
would be superfluous.1
A cramped reading of the BFPP provisions need not attach to
maintain liability for both owner and lessee because under the affiliation
exemption, "title" ought instead be read broadly to include leases. 177 A
reading that permits tenants to retain BFPP status independent of the
owner, when the tenant's affiliation with an owner PRP is solely the
lease, allows for statutory construction consistent with its purpose to
bolster developer liability protection so as to facilitate Brownfield
redevelopment, "while fully protecting human health and the
environment.' 78 The affiliation provision combined with the liability
provisions imply a clear situation anticipated by the drafters of the
statute where the lessee would face potential liability based solely on the
contractual relationship with an owner who is a PRP or has attained and
lost BFPP status.
Additionally, rather than use the term "purchase" to refer to the
action leading to ownership of land or a facility, the BFPP provisions use
173. See Ferrey, supra note 60, at 703-07 (discussing how courts liberally construe CERCLA
because of its remedial purpose).
174. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(40). The interpretation adopted by the EPA would be permissible if
the words used in the statute were slightly different, i.e., if the parenthetical was phrased "or their
tenant," or "or a tenant of that person," or even if "owner" replaced the term "person" throughout
the provision. Cf id.
175. E.g., id § 9607(r).
176. Compare id. § 9601(40) (providing the definition of a BFPP), with id § 9607(a)(1) (listing
the "owner and operator" as a covered person), and id § 9607(r) (stating that a BFPP who may
potentially be liable, will not in fact be liable for a release or threatened release if such is based only
on his being an "owner or operator").
177. See id. § 9601(40)(H)(i)(Il). Such a reading would preclude liability as between the owner
and lessee based solely on the lease and the contemplation of such arrangement is clear from the
plain meaning of another provision containing a parenthetical immediately modifying the preceding
statement. See id. (allowing liability unless a BFPP is affiliated with a PRP through "any contractual
corporate or financial relationship []other than a contractual, corporate, or financial relationship that
is created by the instruments by which title to the facility is conveyed or financed").
178. See, e.g., A Smarter Partnership,supra note 55, at 68-69 (statement of Christine Todd
Whitman, Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency).
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the word "acquisition" throughout. 79 Such diction is significant because
"acquisition" is a term of breadth sufficient to subsume the narrower
scope of both "lease" and "purchase."'' 8 0 The distinction of owner
inheres throughout the provisions explaining the duties and liabilities of
a BFPP, because the statute maintains that a "person," rather than an
"owner," must: (1) not be affiliated with a PRP (other than in an
instrument conveying title); (2) give notice of new releases; and (3)
comply with any institutional controls in place at the site.181 Through
repetition in recent guidance documents, which were issued to interpret
the affiliation exceptions to liability protections, EPA is attempting to
erase the plain meaning of the provision to comport with 82that espoused
in previous guidance on tenant BFPP liability availability. 1
Precluding independent liability for tenants results in a tenuous
liability shield because tenants are powerless to maintain BFPP status
when the owners fail to do so and are at the mercy of EPA to exercise
discretion to recognize their innocence in such situations. 83 This tension
is particularly problematic, because renewable developers strongly favor
18 4
ground leases for projects in lieu of acquiring underlying land in fee.
Because ground leases are the norm when deploying renewable energy
projects, EPA's interpretation of the BFPP provisions forecloses much
of the available liability protection open to those willing to place these
projects on Brownfields.' 85 PPAs could protect the tenant developers
from liability, but EPA's less than impressive record of issuance, in
conjunction with its view of tenants, suggests renewable developers will
179. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 9601(40); id. § 9607(r) (using the term purchaser but only after
implicitly referencing a BFPP and its definition contained in § 101(40)).
180. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 26 (9th ed. 2009) (defining "acquisition" as "[t]he
gaining of possession or control" (emphasis added)), with id. at 970 (defining "lease" as "[a]
contract by which a rightful possessor of real property conveys the right to use and occupy the
property in exchange for consideration"), and id. at 1354 (defining "purchase" as an "act or an
instance of buying").
181. § 9601(40)(C)--(H) (using the term "person" rather than "owner" or "purchaser" to
describe the entity, which must act to achieve and maintain liability protection as a BFPP).
182. Compare Memorandum from Elliott J. Gilberg, Dir., Office of Site Remediation
Enforcement to Reg'l Counsel, Regions I-X and Superfund Nat'l Policy Managers, Regions I-X 2
(Sept. 11, 2011) ("To be a BFPP, a purchaser must satisfy a number of statutory
requirements .. "), with BFPP FAQS, supra note 168, at I (providing tenants liability protection
only where the fee owner has attained BFPP status or where the tenant has attained sufficient indicia
of ownership to functionally be regarded as an owner).
183. See BFPP FAQS, supra note 168, at 3.
184. See discussion supra Part I.C.
185. E.g., FrequentlyAsked Questions on Renewable Energy on ContaminatedLand and Mine
Sites, supra note 148. By interpreting the BFPP liability shield to apply to tenants only derivatively
or when sufficient indicia of ownership are attained, EPA eliminates the acreage from hundreds of
thousands of Brownfield sites from renewable energy developer consideration. Cf id. (identifying in
excess of fifteen million acres of Brownfields suitable for renewable energy deployments).
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fare no better and remain subject to the mercy of the Agency's
CERCLA enforcement discretion. 18 6 But mercy may not be forthcoming
has deeper pockets than the fee owner of a
when the developer
187
contaminated site.

C. Did You Get the Memo?
Doubts Arise that EPA 's BFPPInterpretationIs Correct
The decisions in Commander Oil Corp. v. Barlo Equipment
Corp.188 and Ashley I of Charleston,LLC v. PCS Nitrogen, Inc.' 89 reveal
the negative implications of EPA's BFPP interpretation as applied to
tenant renewable energy developers. Ashley illuminates the extremely
high bar required of Brownfield redevelopers in construction activities to
avoid the imposition of CERCLA liability.1 90 Such perfection, though
desirable, may not be attainable during the installation process of solar or
wind projects, even when designed to minimize impact to the underlying
land. 191 The holding in Commander Oil places developer liability
protections further from the reach of renewable energy developers by
eliminating one of the two categories of BFPP protection open to tenants
according to EPA.' 92 Taken together, the two decisions pierce the shield
of liability protection offered by the BFPP provisions, with or without
discretion and assurances of the provisions' selfEPA's enforcement
1
executing nature. 93
In Ashley, a Brownfield redevelopment company purchased a site
contaminated with, inter alia, lead and arsenic. 194 Ashley, the
redevelopment company, contracted with an environmental assessment
and remediation firm to remove the contaminants, which subsequently
migrated to groundwater supplies.195 Ashley purchased the property
specifically for the purpose of redevelopment under the Brownfields
186.

See supra notes 166-67, 177 and accompanying text.

187. GAO REPORT, supra note 51, at 21-22, 22 n.22 (supporting the inference that when PRPs
face bankruptcy, they can no longer fund removal and remediation activities, which then displace
the cost of site cleanup onto EPA and the Superfund). Cost shifts by a PRP to EPA due to
bankruptcy incentivizes EPA to avoid PPAs to preserve possible enforcement authority that places
the cost burden on another PRP, which in the case of a bankrupt PRP fee-owner would be the tenant.
Cf PPA Memo, supra note 169, at 5 ("[T]he Agency also recognizes that entering into a PPA
affects EPA's ability to ... recover its response costs.").
188. 215 F.3d 321 (2d Cir. 2000).
189.

791 F. Supp. 2d431 (D.S.C. 2011).

190.

See infra notes 200-01 and accompanying text.

191.

See SAMPSON, supra note 133, at 9-13.

192. See infra notes 208-09 and accompanying text.
193. See infra notes 209-10 and accompanying text.
194.

Ashley, 791 F. Supp. 2dat441.

195.

ld. at 468,471.
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Amendments, 196 issued indemnification contracts to the sellers of the
property, 197 and contacted EPA

98

to inquire as to any specific actions

that needed to be taken regarding remediation above and beyond what
was voluntarily implemented.' 99 Despite undertaking significant steps
toward remediating the site, conducting all appropriate inquiries, and
cooperating with the involved environmental agencies, the court denied
Ashley the protection of the BFPP defense. 200 The defense was denied
because Ashley could not foreclose the possibility that remediation
activities, prior to redevelopment, did not exacerbate contamination.20 '
The holding vastly limits the application of the BFPP defense as it
pertains to potential renewable energy developers on Brownfields,
because it is difficult to see how one can ensure that any temporary
exacerbation of contamination during remediation activities does not
occur during or prior to completion of the Brownfield redevelopment
project. 20 2 This holding casts additional doubt upon the validity of EPA's
position that a tenant who attains sufficient indicia of ownership would,
even with no demonstrated contribution to contamination, be able to
utilize the BFPP defense where it is unavailable to a fee owner.0 3
Further doubt arises that BFPP status for tenants is best
accomplished through the tenant acquiring sufficient indicia of
ownership due to the court's holding in Commander Oil. Commander
Oil owned two parcels of land and leased them to Barlo, who in turn,
subleased one parcel to Pasley.20 4 Pasley operated a facility for the
reclamation, revitalization, and repackaging of solvents, which
contaminated Barlo's parcels due to solvent spills and improper
handling. 205 Commander Oil remediated the sites and initiated a cost
recovery action against Pasley and Barlo. 6 But, because Barlo did not
fall under the court's interpretation of "CERCLA's miasmatic

196.

Id. at 467-68.

197.

Id. at460-61.

198. Id.
at 468.
199. Id. at 469-70.
200. Id.at 503.
201. Id. at 501,503.
202. Cf SAMPSON, supra note 133, at 13-14, 21. Despite numerous methods of incorporating
solar and wind energy platforms on land such that contaminants are not permanently disturbed,
construction will require some movement of contaminated soil during excavation, installation,
and maintenance. Cf id.(providing examples of the complications and potential remedies
involved with such projects and mentioning the further complication of meeting specific
government requirements).
203.

See Ashley, 791 F. Supp. 2d at 503.

204. Commander Oil Corp. v. Barlo Equip. Corp., 215 F.3d 321, 324 (2d Cir. 2000).
205. Id.at 324-25.
206. Id. at 325.
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provisions," liability did not attach.2 °7 The court did, however, provide
that a lessee could qualify as a de facto owner for purposes of strict
CERCLA liability if requisite indicia of ownership, such as a long-term,
non-terminable lease were present.2" 8 By requiring a tenant to establish
indicia of ownership to attain BFPP status and avoid liability for
contamination, tenants would expose themselves to CERCLA liability
by attaining indicia of ownership of a degree sufficient for courts to
consider their leasehold equivalent to ownership.20 9 In conjunction with
the holding in Ashley, the circumstances allowing a tenant to exercise the
BFPP defense independent of derivative BFPP status render the
availability of the defense merely illusory.
EPA's BFPP interpretation, though accounting for a significant
deterrent to renewable energy developers initiating ground leases on
Brownfield sites, is not alone in contributing to developer fears
regarding potential CERCLA liability. EPA's construal of the BFPP
provisions as self-executing, 210 to further its longstanding policy 2 11 to
abstain from entering into PPAs with private parties absent exceptional
circumstances, deters expeditious and widespread deployment of
renewable energy on Brownfields. EPA's hope is that by regarding the
BFPP provision as self-executing, transaction costs and time necessitated
by PPAs would be reduced.212 While the possibility of entering into
PPAs with developers who qualify under the BFPP provision was not
foreclosed by EPA's most recent guidance, the circumstances prompting
the Agency's involvement remain vague and solely within Agency
discretion.213
The omission of any applicability to tenant BFPPs in EPA guidance
is worrisome. If the omission were predicated on the interpretation of the
avenues open to BFPP attainment for tenants, 214 then a tenant with
207. Id. at 326, 332.
208. Id. at329-31.
209. See id.(allowing owner liability to be applied to lessees under particular factual scenarios
where the lessee has attained sufficient indicia of ownership so as to allow the relational
considerations of ownership to inhere in the lease); see also Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v.
United States, 556 U.S. 599, 616-17 (2009) (affirming District Court's decision to apportion
arranger liability based on duration, size, and character of leasehold where contamination occurred).
210. BFPP Memo, supra note 169, at 3 ("The Amendments provide a limitation on
liability.., thereby making a federal covenant not to sue under CERCLA unnecessary.").
211. See Guidance on Agreements with Prospective Purchasers of Contaminated Property and
Model Prospective Purchaser Agreement, 60 Fed. Reg. 34,792, 34,793 (July 3, 1995) (expanding
the circumstances where the agency would consider entering into PPAs by reducing the benefit
EPA must receive, but maintaining that the site must be on the National Priorities List or evaluated
for listing).
212. BFPP Memo, supra note 169, at 4-5.
213. Seeid.
214. BFPP FAQS,supranote 168, at 2.
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derivative BFPP status would be foreclosed from pursuing a PPA.
Because EPA would seek enforcement when the owner loses BFPP
status (and consequently the tenant), it would be incompatible to hold the
tenant can be indemnified upon losing the BFPP defense necessarily due
solely to the owner's status as a BFPP. If however, a PPA were available
to a tenant whose BFPP status arises from sufficient indicia of
ownership, 21 5 then the tenant would enjoy the protection of the covenant
not to sue contained therein and avoid the liability that may attach to
216
tenants after the holding in Commander Oil.

IV. BACK TO THE DRAWING BOARD:
CONGRESS MUST GIVE RENEWABLE ENERGY THE
FRAMEWORK TO REPOWER AMERICA'S LAND (AGAIN)

To encourage renewable energy deployment on Brownfields,
adequate immunization from CERCLA liability needs to attach to
developers explicitly and comprehensively, while maintaining
enforcement power in EPA to adequately respond to new, or newly
discovered contamination. 217 A legal challenge to EPA's interpretation
would likely founder on the deference courts accord to Agency
interpretations of statutes the Agency is charged with administering. 218 If
EPA granted BFPP status to tenants to accord with the legislative history
and intent of the Brownfields Amendments, courts could adhere to a
more rigorous analysis than EPA in evaluating the applicability of BFPP
liability protection. 21 9 Because of the potential tension remaining even if
EPA altered its interpretation, and the administrative infeasibility of
satisfying the need for PPAs, the best method for linking Brownfield
redevelopment and renewable energy deployment is to amend CERCLA
to explicitly provide the needed tenant protections.22 °

215.
216.
217.

Id.
See Commander Oil Corp. v. Barlo Equip. Corp., 215 F.3d 321, 330-31 (2d Cir. 2000).
See discussion supraPart IIC.

218. See infra note 221 and accompanying text.
219. See supra Part II.C.
220. See supra notes 170-7 1 and accompanying text. EPA's resistance to the liberal issuance of
PPAs is caused by the desire to protect agency discretion to litigate against PRPs in possible future
enforcement actions related to the site and the inability of the agency to administer PPAs on a
significant scale in light of the number of Brownfield sites needing remediation. See supra notes
170-71 and accompanying text.
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A.

Chevron Deference and Why Litigation Challenging
EPA's Interpretation Will Run out of Gas

Administrative agencies are normally accorded a high level of
deference by courts when challenged in litigation.22 1 In Chevron v.
Natural Resources Defense Council,2 22 the Court evaluated EPA's
interpretation of stationary source under the CAA, which permitted a
plant with multiple points of emission to be conceptualized as a single
source "bubble. 223 Chevron deference is the resultant standard of review
whereby an agency's interpretation of a statute, subsequent regulations
to fill a statutory gap, or resolution of ambiguity left impliedly or
expressly by Congress, is accorded a high level of deference.22 4
Reviewing courts will not upset the agency interpretation in such
instances unless arbitrary, capricious, or plainly in contravention of
statutory language. 22' The determinative factor in the analysis of the
agency's interpretation is whether Congress had an actual intent contrary
to the interpretation, or absent an actual intent, if the agency
interpretation is reasonable in light of the pertinent legislative history.226
EPA's construal of the BFPP provisions as applied to tenants
should not be accorded Chevron deference. The statutory language and
legislative history clearly evinces the determination of Congress to
insulate tenant developers from CERCLA liability if they did not
contribute to the contamination.2 27 The progressive availability of
liability defenses to CERCLA evidences a deliberate move toward
spurring investment in contaminated land redevelopment and narrowing
the focus of CERCLA liability to those who caused or contributed to site
228
contamination.
Additionally, the legislative history preceding
enactment of the Brownfields Amendments should counsel EPA to

221. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc., v. Natural Res. Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984)
(establishing the well-recognized test for evaluating the validity of an agency's interpretation of
statutes it is charged with administering).
222.

467 U.S. 837 (1984).

223. Id.at 840 (internal quotation marks omitted).
224. Id.842-44 ("If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express
delegation of authority to the agency... [and] a court may not substitute its own construction of a
statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency.").
225. Id. at 844 ("Such legislative regulations are given controlling weight unless they are
arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.").
226. See id. at 863.
227. 147 CONG. REC. 27,541, 27,548 (2001) (statement of Rep. Paul Gillmor) (explaining that
Brownfields have been neglected by developers because of the expansive liability scheme under
CERCLA and both owners and tenants operating businesses on Brownfields must be protected
where their activity did not, and does not, contribute to serious threats to the public health and
environment from contamination).
228. See supranotes 54-59 and accompanying text.
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modify its interpretation outside of litigation. 229 When signing the
Brownfields Amendments into law, President George W. Bush
articulated that the federal government must move beyond the "mandate,

regulate, and litigate"
model to allow faster redevelopment with "less
23 0
Federal meddling.,

Litigation against EPA by a party with adequate standing 23' could
be a valuable tool to overcome the faulty interpretation of the BFPP
provisions. This is especially true if primary agency motivations for the
interpretation are perceived burdens in administering the provisions 232
or
jeopardy.
in
not
are
that
powers
enforcement
the desire to retain
Ultimately the threat of litigation could solve the liability-redevelopment
paradox by forcing EPA's hand to reevaluate the BFPP provision
interpretation. 233
However, a challenge to EPA's BFPP interpretation through
litigation would likely be unsuccessful for three reasons. First, though
the legislative history suggests that the Brownfields Amendments should
be read broadly to curtail as much liability as possible for those not
responsible for site contamination, the overriding tone of CERCLA as a
strict liability regime would be difficult to overcome. 234 Though the strict
liability provisions are meant to realize a "polluter pays" paradigm,
necessity (i.e., the lack of adequate liquidity in the Superfund) motivates
EPA to enforce CERCLA against a potentially wider base of parties than

229. E.g., A Smarter Partnership,supra note 55, at 68 (statement of Christine Todd Whitman,
Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency).
230. President George W. Bush, Remarks on Signing the Small Business Liability
Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act in Conshohocken, Pennsylvania (Jan. 11, 2002),
in WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc., Jan. 14, 2002 at 53.
231. A state suing on its behalf may have the best chance of satisfying standing in light of the
"special solicitude" accorded to states suing in their "quasi-sovereign" capacity concerning matters
of conservation and protection of state resources such as air and land. See Massachusetts v. EPA,
549 U.S. 497, 520 (2007); accord Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907)
(explaining that a state suing in its quasi-sovereign capacity "has an interest independent of and
behind the titles of its citizens, in all the earth and air within its domain").
232. See Natural Res. Defense Council, Inc. v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369, 1379-81 (D.C. Cir.
1977) (rejecting EPA claims that hundreds of thousands of permits required by proper interpretation
of non-point source permitting provisions under the Clean Water Act allow narrow interpretation of
such provisions in light of the congressional purpose). But see supra note 166.
233. Compare Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 528-29 (rejecting EPA position that GHGs
are not "air pollutants" under § 202 of the CAA) (internal quotation marks omitted), and Control of
Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. 52,922, 52,925 (denied Sept. 8,
2003) (stating that the CAA does not permit regulation of GHGs as air pollutants), with
Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) of the
Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496, 66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 1)
(finding that GHGs as air pollutants pose threat to human health and welfare).
234. See supra notes 41-48 and accompanying text.
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those who actually contributed to contamination. 35 Second, the
inclusion of tenant liability protection in the BFPP provisions by way of
parenthetical may have created some level of ambiguity, which would
allow a court to sustain EPA's interpretation under a generous exercise
of Chevron deference. 236 Though the importance of statutory language
should depend "not on its punctuation, but on its meaning, ' 237 some
courts construe the language within a parenthetical as having less import
than the language outside of said parenthetical. 238 Lastly, any litigation
brought against EPA for failing to give proper effect to the BFPP
provision as to tenant liability protection would have difficulty surviving
a motion to dismiss for lack of standing. Because EPA has interpreted
the BFPP provision to offer tenant's liability protection derivatively
from the fee owner BFPP status or upon sufficient indicia of
ownership, 239 EPA could successfully argue that tenant BFPP status is
not foreclosed, thereby calling into question the existence of the 24
"injury
in fact" element required under Article III standing jurisprudence. 0
B. ProspectivePurchaserAgreements Used as PaperShields:
Their Infeasibility and AdministrativeBurdens
Were EPA to alter its interpretation of the BFPP provisions, either
as the result of successful litigation challenging the Agency, or solely
from the threat of such litigation, it is not clear the new construal of the
Brownfields Amendments would adequately protect renewable energy
developers. 24' Because of the prevalence of long-term ground leases to
coincide with power purchase agreements, 242 renewable energy
developers who pay taxes for their projects, have unfettered access for
maintenance, and do so for a sufficient time, may still be liable under the

235. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
236. Seesupranote221.
237. Chicksaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84, 98 (2001) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
238. Disabled in Action of Pa. v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 539 F.3d 199, 212 (3d Cir. 2008)
(stating that the language in the parenthetical is related to, not separate from the language before the
parenthetical, and though a reading giving the parenthetical separate weight would be consonant
with the legislative history, it would be "unfaithful to the structure" rather than meaning of the
statute); Peters v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 302, 308-09 (5th Cir. 2004).
239. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
240. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) (explaining that
Article III standing requires: (1) "concrete and particularized" injury that is "actual or imminent;"
(2) an injury that is "fairly trace[able]" to actions of the defendant; and (3) redressability such that a
"favorable decision" will alleviate the injury (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
241. See discussion supra Part III. C.
242. See supra text accompanying note 134.
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holding in Commander Oil.243 Even where liability protection is given to

tenants independent of attaining sufficient indicia of ownership, the
standard for avoiding liability is set quite high. 44 Therefore, though EPA
may change its interpretation, more is needed to protect renewable
energy developers than the BFPP provisions provided alone or
buttressed by EPA guidance and discretion. 245
EPA can additionally alter its policy regarding the systematic
issuance of prospective purchaser agreements 246 and release guidance
stating that those developing renewable energy projects on Brownfields
would be granted such agreements provided all statutory and regulatory
requirements have been met. Revising both the PPA and BFPP policies
to accommodate the typical lease-based structure for renewable energy
development would create a complimentary system whereby the
interpretations of the courts would be less likely to conflict. 247 EPA is

authorized to enter into PPAs under CERCLA, which include covenants
not to sue for future releases, and such PPAs define the scope of liability
for the parties subject to the agreement.248 Courts evaluate covenants not
to sue under any such agreement to ensure the agreement is in the public
interest, expedites site response actions, and otherwise accords with
CERCLA.249 If fair to the public, courts will not upset EPA
determinations regarding the agreement. 250
PPAs may in theory be able to shield renewable energy developers
from court decisions such as Ashley25 1 and Commander Oil,252 but EPA
243. Commander Oil Corp. v. Barlo Equip. Corp., 215 F.3d 321, 330-31 (2d Cir. 2000)
(holding that sufficient indicia of ownership will inhere to a lease where the lessee has control of
land for an extended term, lease cannot be terminated by lessor prior to term end, the lessee pays for
taxes or assessments, and the lessee is responsible for repairs and maintenance).
244. See supra Part III.C.
245. See BFPP Memo, supra note 169, at 1-2 (stating that PPAs are "unnecessary" after
BFPP enactment).
246. See Announcement and Publication of Guidance on Agreements with Prospective
Purchasers of Contaminated Property and Model Prospective Purchaser Agreement, 60 Fed. Reg.
34,792, 34,793 (July 3, 1995) (requiring EPA to have taken, be taking, or anticipate taking response
action at the property and EPA or the community to not derive a substantial development from the
agreement to ensure that "EPA does not become unnecessarily involved in purely private real estate
transactions"); BFPP Memo, supra note 169, at 3 (maintaining unwillingness to involve EPA in
purely private real estate transactions on Brownfields because bona fide prospective purchaser
provisions are self-executing and thus do not require pre-purchase agreements).
247. See supra Part III.C.
248. 42 U.S.C. § 9622(a) (2006) (allowing EPA to enter into settlement agreements with PRPs,
which, inter alia, define the scope of liability, actions to be taken on site, money to be paid, and
include covenants not to sue).
249. Id.§ 9622(0(1).
250. E.g., United States v. Azko Coatings of Am., Inc., 949 F.2d 1409, 1435 (6th Cir. 1991).
251. Ashley 11of Charleston, LLC v. PCS Nitrogen, Inc., 791 F. Supp. 2d 431, 501, 503
(D.S.C. 2011) (holding that BFPP defense was unavailable to Brownfield redeveloper who could
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cannot be forced to issue these agreements.253 Further, the amount of
PPAs necessary to convert the eleven thousand Brownfields identified
254
by NREL as capable of supporting renewable energy deployments,
may pose a significant administrative burden to EPA because until 2005,
EPA only issued approximately one hundred forty PPAs 5 Because the
PPA could be construed as an approval or permitting of the underlying
project on behalf of EPA, environmental review may be triggered under
the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969.256 The need to undertake
an Environmental Impact Statement presents a process open to challenge
by outside stakeholders antagonistic to the underlying project, and
increases the transaction costs to the developer. 57 For these reasons, an
interpretive change of the BFPP provisions, even where accompanied by
liberal administration of PPAs, is not feasible to adequately foster a
scheme of liability protection for renewable energy developers.
C. All Quiet on the Western Front:
The Golden State Warms the Chill by Extending
Liability Protectionto Tenants (Without Parentheses)
To best facilitate renewable energy deployment on Brownfields
without the fear of liability from EPA, or courts strictly interpreting the
BFPP provisions, the statutory protections for tenants need to be made
explicit. 258 Explicit protection could be extended to tenants either

through amendment of the current BFPP provision to remove the
parenthetical inclusion of tenants, or by inserting a separate section
pertaining specifically to bona fide prospective tenants. 259 The advantage
not foreclose that construction activities did not in some way cause additional site contamination).
252. Commander Oil Corp. v. Barlo Equip. Corp., 215 F.3d 321, 330-31 (2d Cir. 2000)
(holding that a lessee attaining sufficient indicia of ownership would be regarded as a fee owner,
which would allow imposition of CERCLA "owner" liability).
253. 42 U.S.C. § 9622(a) ("The [EPA], in [its] discretion, may enter into an agreement... [and
a] decision of the [EPA] to use or not to use the procedures in this section is not subject to judicial
review." (emphasis added)).
254. See supratext accompanying note 148.
255. See PPA Memo, supra note 169, at 2.
256. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (2006) (requiring environmental impact statements when major
federal action may significantly affect the quality of the human environment and specifies the
impacts and evaluates alternatives); 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18 (2011) (including in the definition
of "Major Federal action" policies, procedures, systematic agency decisions, and approval of
specific projects).
257. See, e.g., Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of the Army, 398 F.3d
105, 115-16 (1st Cir. 2005) (challenging NEPA procedures taken by the Army and off-shore wind
developer in order to stop or delay the wind farm project, which would obstruct ocean views from
Nantucket Sound).
258. See supra Part lI.B-C.
259. See supra notes 236-38 and accompanying text. Because the parenthetical structure
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of the latter approach is that precedent exists on the state level that could
serve as a template for the new bona fide prospective tenant provision
needed to motivate renewable energy developers to site projects
on Brownfields.26 °
California enacted the California Land Reuse and Revitalization
Act of2004261 to mirror the added liability protections, such as the BFPP
provisions, included in the Brownfields Amendments to CERCLA. z62
Like the Federal Brownfields Amendments, the California revisions
were somewhat ambiguous as to whether tenants could attain BFPP
status independent of the fee owner.2 63 Recognizing that redevelopers
often look to contaminated land to develop pursuant to a long-term
ground lease, rather than by purchasing the land, the Daehnke Cruz Law
Group, LLP, drafted and sponsored SB 989264 through the California
legislative process in 2006.265 SB 989 created a bona fide ground tenant
("BFGT") category for liability protection in order to avoid the
stockpiling of Brownfield properties, which allows tenant redevelopment
without significant risk of liability. 266 The BFGT provisions require
tenants to demonstrate that all contaminant releases occurred prior to the
leasehold, the leasehold exceeds twenty-five years, and the lessee is not
affiliated with parties responsible for contamination. 267 If the tenant
receives certification from an appropriate agency, city, or municipality
then immunity from liability attaches so long as institutional controls are
observed, no new releases occur, and the tenant conducts a site
assessment prior to construction to identify the boundary and scope of
contamination. 2 68 This temporal bifurcation of liability functionally
accomplishes what the current form of CERCLA prohibits to be done

including tenants in coverage of the BFPP provision may be held to be dependent on, or subsidiary
to, the language including owners despite the legislative history, removal of the parenthetical may
be needed to realize congressional intent. See supra notes 236-3 8 and accompanying text.
260. See infra notes 266-68 and accompanying text.
261. 2004 Cal. Stat. 5490.
262. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25395.81 (West 2006) (including defenses to liability for
BFPPs, innocent landowners, and contiguous property owners).
263. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25395.69 (West 2006). The California statute contained
language similar to that in the Brownfields Amendments by defining a bona fide purchaser as "a
person, or tenant of a person," though the California statute did not utilize a parenthetical to refer to
the tenant-a punctuation choice which prompted years of EPA interpretive guidance under the
federal analog. Id.
264. 2006 Cal. Stat. 910.
265. See Our SB 989 Legislative Accomplishment, DAEHNKE CRUZ L. GRP., LLP,
http://www.daehnkecruz.com/sb989.php (last visited Feb. 7, 2013).
266. S. 989-2006, Reg. Sess., at 4 (Cal. 2006).
267. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25395.102(b) (West Supp. 2013).
268. See id. § 25395.103(a).
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spatially, the separation of the land into contaminated and
non-contaminated parcels. Liability and immunity attach, respectively.
Amending CERCLA to include a BFGT provision is the solution to
both EPA's reluctance to granting tenants immunization from liability
and the danger of courts interpreting the current statute in a way that
does not adequately protect renewable energy projects conducted
pursuant to ground leases.269 It is not enough to merely leave the issue of
tenant immunization to the legislatures of the states, because although
CERCLA does not expressly preempt state site contamination laws, the
conflicting nature of express immunity at the state level, and
discretionary immunity from EPA on the federal level, strongly suggests
courts will find conflict preemption.270 Unlike the California BFGT
provision requiring a twenty-five year ground lease, an amendment on
the federal level would encompass more renewable energy projects, such
as solar photovoltaic deployments, if a shorter ground lease term
threshold were chosen. 271 Nor should the federal BFGT provision require
agency approval because of the administrative burdens inhering in sitespecific approvals. 272 However, the redeveloper ought to submit a site
assessment, site plan, and signed acknowledgment verifying completion
of all appropriate inquiries to the EPA to assist the agency in subsequent
enforcement actions if the tenant does cause, or contribute, to a future
release of contaminants.273
A federal BFGT provision should also integrate the functional
bifurcation of the underlying estate to require only the site assessment
and clean-up activity necessary to guarantee the site is safe for the
27 4
Conceivably, such
purpose of the proposed redevelopment project.

269. See supra notes 207-09 and accompanying text. Relying on EPA's interpretation alone
will make liability protection for renewable energy developers utilizing ground leases at
contaminated sites derivative of the underlying owner's BFPP status or subject to attaining
sufficient indicia of ownership leading to potential owner liability pursuant to the reasoning in
Commander Oil. See supra notes 207-09 and accompanying text.
270. E.g., Ronald G. Aronovsky, A Preemption Paradox: Preserving the Role of State Law in
PrivateCleanup Cost Disputes, 16 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 225,278-83 (2008).
271. See Solar Power Purchase Agreements, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/greenpower/
buygp/solarpower.htm (last updated May 24, 2012) (stating most solar leases fall within range of six
to twenty-five years because solar photovoltaic deployments, while capital intensive, require a
shorter term to recoup initial capital costs and a fair return through use of a PPA than do wind farms,
partially because the footprint and necessary leased acreage is smaller and equipment cheaper).
272. See supranotes 169-70 and accompanying text.
273. See supra notes 43-47. By reporting to EPA, the agency is able to monitor the locations
and number of sites that are attempting to be remediated and can adjust its enforcement actions
against other PRPs accordingly. See supranotes 43-47.
274. See CAL. HEALTH & SAEFTY CODE § 25395.103(c) (West Supp. 2013) (providing that the
BFGT need only provide site assessment and response activities necessary to ensure the land is
safe for the proposed project and to ensure the project does not cause or contribute to
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limitations in the context of renewable energy deployments would be
limited to the soil surface and where support pylons or wind turbines are
located, and only to depths required for excavation and maintenance. 275
Like the California provisions, the federal provision, to be palatable to
Congress, ought to require the funds for the ground lease either be paid
to the underlying fee owner to continue full site remediation or to the
EPA for replenishment of the Superfund. 76 In this way the bifurcation of
the underlying estate does not result in the diminishment of nonredeveloped Brownfields without a corresponding decrease in the total
277
number of Brownfields generally.
The goal of the proposed amendments should be not to spur
redevelopment in a vacuum, but to recognize that renewable energy
Brownfield deployments in particular are suitable for liability protection,
and the BFGT amendment should reflect that goal before expanding
such protections generally. 278 Any amendment to include explicit
liability immunization for renewable energy developers' activity on the
surface of contaminated land should be narrowly drawn but
unwaveringly followed to encourage renewable energy, reduce carbon
emissions, and remove the hundreds of thousands of contaminated sites
across America. The attached Appendix presents a model statute to
amend CERCLA in the ways appropriate to protect its remedial goals
while giving renewable energy developers who utilize ground leases the
liability protection needed to minimize costs, attain financing, and
responsibly avoid liability for contamination not caused through
operation of renewable generation projects.

further contamination).
275. See generally SAMPSON, supra note 133 (evaluating the various methods for solar
deployment on contaminated land to mitigate impacts on underlying contaminants).
276. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25395.102(b)(5)(A) (West Supp. 2013). In light of
the massive budget shortfalls and large Congressional appropriations necessary to fund site
remediation, Congress is likely to endorse a statutory amendment relieving the fiscal stress on the
Superfund. See supranote 49 and accompanying text.
277. Cf Basic Information, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/brownfields/basic info.htm#plan (last
updated July 16, 2012). Indeed the purpose of the Brownfields Amendments is to decrease the
amount of Brownfields, which currently number nearly half a million discrete sites. See supra note
16. By merely bifurcating the contaminated land into a contaminated and non-contaminated parcel
without addressing remaining contamination, the remedial purpose of CERCLA would be
undermined. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
278. See BFPP Memo, supra note 169, at 4. Initially limiting a proposed amendment granting
liability immunization to BFGTs who are renewable energy developers, is consonant with EPA's
current determination of when to grant a PPA. See BFPP Memo, supra note 169, at 4 (granting a
PPA is advisable where necessary to ensure completion of the project, which will have substantial
public benefit such as reusing blighted land, creating jobs, reimbursing EPA, or other significant
environmental benefits).
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CONCLUSION

Though a comprehensive climate change policy has not been
adopted in the United States, recognition of electricity production's
significant contributions to anthropogenic carbon emissions is widely
recognized.2 7 9 Climate science has, with greater certainty, identified the
imminent, and far-reaching impacts of climate change, which has
fortunately coincided with significant increases in the deployment of
renewable energy generation capacity. 280 However, the current
generation capacity of renewable projects is insufficient to adequately
mitigate carbon emissions from the energy sector. 281 Renewable energy
markets are increasingly important to incentivize development of low
carbon electricity generation, comply with state mechanisms mandating
renewable energy, and capitalize on government incentives available to
clean energy technologies.282 Siting renewable energy projects on
Brownfields accrues significant public benefits by both meeting national
renewable energy goals, and reducing the number of contaminated sites,
which blight communities and threaten public health.283 Despite the
demonstrated feasibility of siting renewable energy on Brownfields,
EPA and court interpretations of CERCLA's liability provisions have
not kept pace with the needs of renewable energy developers, nor
honored the congressional intent motivating subsequent CERCLA
amendments. 284 Recognizing the ground-lease paradigm of typical
renewable energy deployments necessitates a reexamination of the
current liability protections offered to those who seek to remediate
Brownfields.28 5 To promote renewable energy project siting on
Brownfields, CERCLA must be amended to include provisions granting
liability immunity to BFGTs who were not responsible for prior site
contamination, and do not cause, or exacerbate, such contamination
286
Such an amendment has the potential to
through on-site activities.

279. See supra notes 1-10 and accompanying text.
280.

See supra notes 4, 11 and accompanying text.

281. See, e.g., FIFTH CLIMATE REPORT, supra note 94, at 28 & fig.3-5 (finding that fossil fuel
combustion accounts for more than eight percent of U.S. carbon emissions annually).
282. See id. at 40-42.
283.
284.

See discussion supra Parts lI.C, III.A.
See discussion supra Part Ill.

285.

See discussion supra Part l.C.

286.

See discussion supra Part V.C.
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foster renewable energy deployments that could remediate thousands of
the more than half a million contaminated sites nationwide and provide
clean energy to contribute to mitigation of the anthropogenic carbon
emissions causing climate change.287
JonathanJ. Nasca*

287. See supra note 148 and accompanying text. NREL has already identified fifteen million
acres of Brownfields with the potential for utility-scale renewable energy deployments and with
explicit liability protection for renewable energy developers and continued vitality in renewable
energy demand, the United States could increase its percentage of renewable energy generation from
three percent to more than a third as Germany has done. Compare FIFTH CLIMATE REPORT, supra
note 94, at 27, with Stefes, supra note 116.
* J.D. candidate, 2013; Hofstra University School of Law. My heartfelt thanks to those
members of the Hofstra Law Review who were instrumental in developing this Note to its current
publishable state through their diligence, expertise, and flexibility, most notably Rebecca Sklar,
Stephen Piraino, and Dave Gerardi in the managing office, and my fellow Notes & Comments
editors Ana Getiashvili and Tiffani Figueroa who coordinated my work. I also could not have
worked through the writing process without the inspiration and tutelage of Professor Katrina Fischer
Kuh to whom I will always owe my interest in environmental law and opportunities for professional
development. I would finally like to thank my parents, Joe and Lisa, for their pervasive support, my
surrogate parents, Angelo and Eleanor Platis, for keeping me healthy and fed these three long years,
and last but certainly not least, my partner, Stephanie Platis, for continuously inspiring me to try and
be the person I want to be.
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APPENDIX

PROPOSED MODEL STATUTE

An Act

To provide certain relief for renewable energy developers under the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act of 1980, and to amend such Act to promote the cleanup and reuse of
Brownfields by the siting of renewable energy generation thereon, to
provide the Environmental Protection Agency regulatory authority to
promulgate rules in support of this goal, and for other purposes.
Be it enactedby the Senate andHouse of Representativesof the
United States ofAmerica in Congress assembled,
SECTION 101. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "RePowering America's Land Act."
SECTION 102. BONA FIDE GROUND TENANT.
(a) DEFINITION OF BONA FIDE GROUND TENANT.-Section 101 of

the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act of 1980 (42 U.S.C. § 9601) is amended by adding at the
end the following:
"(42) BONA FIDE GROUND TENANT.-The term 'bona fide ground
tenant' shall mean a person who acquires a leasehold interest of no less
than fifteen years in a Brownfield site as defined in this section after the
date of enactment of this paragraph, and such leasehold interest grants
rights only to the surface of the parcel leased.
"(A) DISPOSAL PRIOR TO GROUND LEASE.-All disposal of
hazardous substances occurred before the person acquires the leasehold
and the proposed use of the leasehold will not involve the use,
procurement, transportation, manufacture, or potential release of
hazardous substances.
"(B) INCORPORATION OF BONA FIDE PROSPECTIVE PURCHASER

OBLIGATIONS.-The person adheres to all requirements applicable to
BFPPs in this section regarding Inquiries, Notices, Care, Cooperation,
Access, Assistance, Institutional Controls, and Affiliations.
"(C) PUBLIC BENEFIT, PRESUMPTION OF BENEFIT FOR RENEWABLE

ENERGY.-The person acquiring a qualifying leasehold under paragraph
(A) will develop a project that accrues substantial public benefit
including benefits to the environment, economy, community, or
promotion of any municipal, state, or federal land use program. Projects
for the generation, storage, transmission, or distribution of electricity
from renewable sources, or technology, will be presumed to accrue the
paragraph.
under this
required
benefit
public
substantial

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2014

41

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 9

HOFSTRA LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 41:267

"(D) NOTICE TO EPA.-The person acquiring a qualifying
leasehold must disclose the acquisition and proposed project to EPA
within ninety days of acquiring the leasehold and submit project plans,
site assessment results and the name of the person prior to construction."
SECTION 103. BONA FIDE GROUND TENANT RELIEF.

(a) EXEMPTIONS.-Section
107
of the
Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980
(42 U.S.C. § 9607) is amended by adding the following:
"(s)

BONA

FIDE

GROUND

TENANT

EXEMPTION.-Except

as

provided in subparagraph (1), a person shall not be liable with respect to
response costs at a facility under this Act based solely on section (a), and
the person can demonstrate that their activity did not cause or contribute
to the release of hazardous substances on the site and the person did not
impede the performance of a response action or natural resource
restoration.
"(1) ExCEPTIONS.-Subsection (s) shall not apply in a case in
which"(A) The President determines the person has failed to comply with
an information request, administrative subpoena, or institutional control
under this Act or has impeded or is impeding any response action or has
otherwise contributed to the release of hazardous substances."
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Dolores Gebhardt, B.S., J.D., Special Professor of Law
James F. Gesualdi, B.A., M.A., J.D., Special Professor of Law
George Giuliani, B.A., M.S., M.A., J.D., Psy.D., Special Professor of Law
Elizabeth M. Glazer, B.A., M.A., J.D., Associate Professorof Law
Scott J. Glick, B.A., J.D., Director of the Hofstra Law in D.C. Externship Program and Special Professor of
Law
Barry Goldberg, Special Professor of Law
Daniel J. H. Greenwood, A.B., J.D., Professor of Law
John DeWitt Gregory, B.A., J.D., Sidney and Walter Siben DistinguishedProfessor of Family Law
Joanna L. Grossman, B.A., J.D., Professorof Law
Frank Gulino, B.A., J.D., Associate Professorof Legal Writing
Jennifer A. Gundlach, B.A., J.D., Senior Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Experiential Education and
Clinical Professor of Law
Michael Haber, B.A., M.A., J.D., Visiting Assistant ClinicalProfessor of Law
Marc L. Hamroff, Special Professor of Law
Robert Harper, Special Professor of Law
Grant M. Hayden, B.A., J.D., M.A., Professorof Law and John DeWitt Gregory Research Scholar
Carol Casazza Herman, B.A., J.D., Visiting Practitioner-in-Residencein Environmental Law and Special
Professor of Law
James E. Hickey, Jr., B.S., J.D., Ph.D., Professor of Law
John Hogan, Special Professorof Law
The Honorable Richard Horowitz, Special Professor of Law
Bernard E. Jacob, B.A., J.D., Ph.D., DistinguishedProfessor Emeritus of Law
Michael D. Jaffe, B.A., J.D., Special Professor of Law
Alan Jakimo, B.A., M.B.A., J.D., Special Professor of Law
Susan H. Joffe, B.A., M.A., J.D., Associate Professor of Legal Writing
Gary Kalbaugh, BCL, LL.M., Special Professor of Law
Kara Kaplan, Special Professorof Law
Elena Karabatos, Special Professor of Law
David A. Kaufman, B.A., J.D., Special Professor of Law
Lawrence Kessler, B.A., J.D., Richard J. Cardali DistinguishedProfessorof Trial Advocacy
Avi Z. Kestenbaum, B.A., J.D., LL.M., Special Professor of Law
Brian Klein, Special Professor of Law
Fred Klein, B.A., J.D., Visiting Assistant Professor of Law
Spencer Klein, Special Professor of Law
The Honorable Gary F. Knobel, B.A., J.D., LL.M., Special Professor of Law
Abe Krieger, Special Professor of Law
Stefan Krieger, B.A., J.D., Professor of Law, Directorof Centerfor Applied Legal Reasoning and Director
Emeritus of Hofstra Clinical Programs
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Julian Ku, B.A., J.D., Professor of Law and Faculty Director of International Programs
Katrina Fischer Kuh, B.A., J.D., Associate Professor of Law
Lawrence Kurland, Special Professor of Low
Eric Lane, B.A., M.A., J.D., LL.M., Dean and Eric J. Schmertz Distinguished Professor of Public Law and
Public Service
Anibal Rosario Lebron, Visiting Assistant Professor of Legal Writing
Richard G. Leland, B.S., J.D., Special Professor of Law
Theo Liebmann, B.A., J.D., Clinical Professor of Law and Directorof Clinical Programs
Barry Lites, Special Professor of Law
Kimberly Luckey, Special Professor of Law
Barbara A. Lukeman, B.A., J.D., Special Professor of Law
Andrew H. Lupu, B.A., J.D., Special Professor of Law
Malachy T. Mahon, B.A., J.D., Founding Dean Emeritus
Lewis R. Mandel, A.B., J.D., LL.M., Special Professor of Law
Irina D. Manta, B.A., J.D., Associate Professorof Law
Serge Martinez, B.A., I.D., Clinical Professorof Law
The Honorable Edward W. McCarty III, B.S., J.D., Special Professor of Law
Gerald McCloskey, Special Professor of Law
Kevin McElroy, B.A., J.D., Assistant Professor of Legal Writing
Christopher T. McGrath, Special Professor of Law
Gerard Messina, Special Professor of Law
Janis Meyer, Special Professor of Law
Richard K. Neumann, Jr., B.A., Dipl., J.D., LL.M., Professor of Law
Christopher Nicolino, Special Professorof Law
Andrew Oringer, A.B., M.B.A., J.D., Special Professor of Law
Ashira Ostrow, B.A., J.D., Associate Professor of Law
Mark Padin, B.A., M.S., J.D., Associate Professor of Academic Support
Peter Parcher, Special Professor of Law
Curtis Pew, B.A., M.P.P.A., J.D., Visiting Clinical Professor of Law
Damian Pieper, Special Professor of Law
John Pieper, B.A., J.D., LL.M., Special Professor of Law
Troy Pieper, Special Professor of Law
Jack M. Platt, B.A., J.D., Special Professorof Law
Neal R. Platt, B.S., J.D., L.L.M., Special Professor of Law
Rona L. Platt, B.S., J.D., Special Professorof Law
Seth A. Presser, J.D., Special Professor of Law
Andrew Reiss, Special Professor of Law
Alan N. Resnick, B.S., J.D., LL.M., Benjamin Weintraub DistinguishedProfessor of Bankruptcy Law
Arianne Reyser, Special Professor of Law
Joseph Richetti, Special Professor of Law
John L. Rivkin, Special Professor of Law
Jared Rosenblatt, Special Professor of Law
Paul Rubell, B.A., I.D., Special Professor of Law
Ben B. Rubinowitz, B.A., J.D., Special Professor of Law
James Sample, B.A., J.D., Associate Professor of Law
Andrew Schepard, B.A., M.A., J.D., Professor of Law and Director of the Centerfor Children, Familiesand
the Law
Robert Schwenkel, Special Professor of Law
Courtney Selby, B.A., J.D., M.L.I.S., Associate Dean for Information Services, Director of the Law Library &
Associate Professor of Law
Rita Sethi, Special Professor of Law
Grant Shehigian, Professor of Law
Gregory H. Shill, Visiting Assistant Professor of Law
Norman I. Silber, B.A., M.A., Ph.D., J.D., Professor of Law
Jeffrey Silberfeld, B.A., J.D., Visiting Assistant Professor of Law
Ronald Silverman, B.A., J.D., Distinguished ProfessorEmeritus of Law
Roy D. Simon, B.A., J.D., DistinguishedProfessor Emeritus of Law
William M. Skehan, B.A., M.B.A., J.D., Special Professorof Law
David Smith, Special Professor of Law
Judd Sneirson, B.A., J.D., Visiting Associate Professor of Law
Lisa Spar, B.A., J.D., M.S., Special Professorof Law
Barbara Stark, B.A., J.D., LL.M., Professor of Law and Hofstra Research Fellow, Associate Dean for
Intellectual Life
Amy R. Stein, B.A., J.D., Professor of Legal Writing, Assistant Dean for Adjunct Instruction, and Coordinator
of the Legal Writing Program
Michael Steinberg, Special Professor of Law
Jacob L. Stevens, B.A., J.D., Visiting Associate Clinical Professorof Law
Daniel M. Sullivan, B.S., J.D., Special Professor of Law
Michael Veechione, Special Professorof Law
Robert Wagner, Visiting Assistant Professor of Law
Vern R. Walker, B.A., M.A., Ph.D., J.D., Professor of Law and Director of the Research Laboratoryfor Law,
Logic and Technology
Bennett J. Wasserman, B.A., M.A., J.D., Special Professor of Law
Stephen Weiner, B.A., J.D., Special Professor of Low
Joel Weintraub, A.B., M.D., J.D., Special Professor of Law
Karen Weiss, Visiting Assistant Professorof Legal Writing
Carolyn Wolf, B.A., M.B.A., M.S., J.D., Special Professor of Law
Lauris Wren, B.A., J.D., Clinical Professor of Law and Directorfor the LGBT Fellowship
Patrick Young, Special Professor of Law
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